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Texas Law Review
Volume 58, Number 4, April 1980
Constitutional Fate
Philip Bobbitt*
Editor's Introduction
The Mary Ireland Graves Dougherty Lectures in Constitutional
Law were established in 1979 at the University of Texas School of Law
in the memory of Mrs. Dougherty by her family. Professor Bobbitt
delivered the inaugural series of these lectures on three evenings in
April 1979.a Of those in attendance, only Professor Bobbitt's students,
who had witnessed the evolution of his ideas during that year, and a
few colleagues with whom he must have shared his thoughts, could
have expected what followed on those spring evenings in Austin. His
subject was "the question of judicial review." So stated, the subject
hardly appeared to be fresh. For those students in attendance, how-
ever, whose pursuit of constitutional mysteries had been limited to little
more than dubious meanderings along the doctrinal trails of the United
States Reports, Professor Bobbitt brought a new perspective on the
Constitution and on constitutional law.
He began on the first evening by explaining that he would ap-
proach his subject in a roundabout way, by first identifying six recur-
ring forms of argument in constitutional interpretation, and then, by
describing them and analyzing their respective appeals to our "consti-
tutional sense," working backward to discover what those insights
could tell us of the legitimacy of judicial review. This rather unconven-
tional approach was necessary, we were told, to avoid the mistake of
previous discussions of the question: analyzing the legitimacy of judi-
cial review by means of arguments which themselves betray a commit-
* Professor of Law, The University of Texas. A.B. 1971, Princeton University; J.D. 1975,
Yale University.
a The lectures, as delivered and as they appear here, were greatly condensed from a book-
length manuscript, to be published separately.
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ment to a particular basis for judicial review and thus which cannot
serve to establish a foundation for legitimacy.
Interwoven with this typology of constitutional arguments were vi-
gnettes about men who acted in response to similar theoretical crises in
the development of twentieth century constitutional law, and who, in
responding, came to be associated with particular types of constitu-
tional argument. Thus, for example, Professor Bobbitt examined the
asymmetrical, falsifying feature of historical argument and its relation
to the work of William Winslow Crosskey. He discussed the contribu-
tions of Justice Hugo Black and identified the genesis of incorporation
doctrine in the requirements, both practical and theoretical, of textual,
argument. And, in similar fashion, Professor Bobbitt in turn addressed
the features of structural, doctrinal, and prudential argument and the
prominent advocates with which each has come to be associated.
Throughout that first evening, however, Professor Bobbitt cau-
tioned that the forms of argument he had identified were merely con-
ventions of our profession, with their own peculiar strengths and
weaknesses as interpretive tools. The preference of a particular scholar
or judge constituted the writer's legal style. But this list of conventions
was not intended to be exhaustive, nor could it be. And at the close of
that first lecture Professor Bobbitt identified one other form of argu-
ment, certainly unconventional and undoubtedly powerful, if unnamed
and unacknowledged by its practitioners. He termed this argument
"ethical" and devoted the second lecture to describing it and making
the case for its legitimate use as a method of legal discourse. He of-
fered a method for distinguishing constitutional ethical arguments-
those with a basis in a particularly constitutional ethos-from moral
arguments generally, and explored the application of that distinction to
the review of state statutes. Of perhaps greatest interest to his audience,
Professor Bobbitt then explained the principle by which the ethic of
limited government could be used to generate rights not specifically
named in the constitutional text: that a state may not use, in the pursuit
of its quite different, unenumerated ends, any means that would be
denied the federal government-that is, one that is not necessary and
proper to the achievement of the enumerated federal powers. He went
on to apply this principle as a way of explaining many constitutional
decisions and as a way of justifying, in particular, the controversial de-
cision in Roe v. Wade.b Finally, Professor Bobbitt used the conception
of ethical argument to account for the historical development of sub-
b 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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stantive due process and the misguided attempts of the federal courts to
impose limits on the ends sought by the states.
He closed the second lecture by suggesting that the constitutional
arguments he had described were related to the particular functions
exercised by the Supreme Court in each case. On the following night
Professor Bobbitt devoted his final lecture to a discussion of those func-
tions. Thus, he turned to the modern functions identified by Charles
Black and Alexander Bickel and demonstrated that each reflected a
particular argumentative perspective. To these Professor Bobbitt ad-
ded the "cueing" function and analyzed one recent controversial deci-
sion, National League of Cities v. Useryc which he argued could not
properly be understood without an appreciation of its function. He de-
voted the remainder of the final lecture to another purpose of constitu-
tional decision, which he termed the "expressive" function: judicial
opinions were not solely wellsprings of doctrine; they could serve as
well to express something of what we are as a people and of what, in
our more reflective moments, we would wish to become.
He concluded the third lecture with a theory of the interplay of the
types of argument-each shown to be derived from prominent features
of the written Constitution-and choices about the function to be exer-
cised, choices that, with the chance and highlighted facts of a case,
make one approach more appropriate than another. With this descrip-
tion came a picture of how change comes to the Constitution and the
"answer" to a question with which the first lecture began and to which
all the lectures proceeded-how the legitimacy of judicial review is es-
tablished. The conception that emerged left many of us, who had too
soon grown cynical about the task of judges, with an educated hopeful-
ness, with a renewed faith in the processes of constitutional decision,
and with a new appreciation for the links between ourselves, our past,
our Constitution, and our many fates, as yet unclear, that it holds
within it.
As a law student and editor on the Yale Law Journal, Professor
Bobbitt once wrote an introduction to a similar series of lectures deliv-
ered by Professor Grant Gilmore at Yale. It is appropriate to quote
here from what Professor Bobbitt wrote about the last of Gilmore's lec-
tures:
Twenty-five years ago, Professor Gilmore wrote of Karl
Llewellyn in these pages that he "and his co-conspirators were
right in everything they said about the law. They skillfully led us
into the swamp. Their mistake was in being sure that they knew
c 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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the way out of the swamp; they did not, at least we are still
there." And, Gilmore told us that afternoon, for tomorrow and
tomorrow.d
One wonders to what extent Professor Bobbitt recalled Gilmore's
message as he prepared his own lectures (which, as you will see, are in
part lectures about lectures). For they stand as signposts on the way
out of the swamp to those who might have consigned their tomorrows
to an existence there.e They point the way to firm ground, not by
promising yet another "escape from [the] inconclusiveness" of constitu-
tional law---whose promise has sent so many, not out of the swamp,
but merely into another part of it-but by showing us that the study of
constitutional law is the study of ourselves. We must live with the real-
ity of a Constitution whose contours are as immutable, and as change-
able, as we are. But that modus vivendi is cause for despair or
disparagement only to those who have forgotten, or never knew, that
the framers could have given us nothing more. They gave us their
ideas, a link with a rich past, and a special way of governing ourselves.
And, of course, they gave us the document itself, which over the years
has changed us just as surely as we have changed it.
What follows here is the text, without substantial revision, of those
first Mary Ireland Graves Dougherty Lectures in Constitutional Law.
We cannot duplicate the sights and sounds of the lecture hall on those
spring evenings, but we hope that the words will prove to the reader as
thought-provoking and as full of hopeful promise as they did to those
who heard them delivered a year ago in April.
P. C.F
I. Constitutional Argument
The central position in the constitutional debate of the last quarter
d Editors' Introduction to Gilmore, The Storrs Lectures: The Age ofAnxiety, 84 YALE L.J.
1022, 1027 (1975) (quoting Gilmore, Book Review, 60 YALE L.J. 1251, 1252 (1951)).
e There appeared recently in these pages two articles on judicial review that are as dis-
turbing as these lectures are hopeful. Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpre-
tation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEXAS L. REv. 1307 (1979); Leedes, he
Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEXAS L. REv. 1361 (1979). To extend the metaphor introduced in the
text, perhaps inadvisedly, these works describe the swamp to us, but deny the existence of a path
out of it, or at least the existence of one the Justices are likely to find. Those articles and the
lectures printed here may profitably be read together. As the industrious reader will discover, the
perspective of these lectures is fundamentally different from the one shared by Tushnet and
Leedes and other incompatible pairs, who though often at polar extremes, seem to share an expec-
tation of what law should be.
f Text following note 22 infra.
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century has been occupied by the idea of the legitimacy of judicial re-
view of constitutional questions by the United States Supreme Court.
This debate, ongoing in one form or another since the founding of the
Republic, is thought to have achieved this centrality with the Court's
decision in the historic Brown desegregation case' and to have become
the question of the hour in the academy with Judge Learned Hand's
Holmes Lectures2 in 1958, lectures that severely criticized the basis for
such review.
Throughout the 1960s the activism of the Warren Court kept the
issue of legitimacy alive, and interest in the issue was heightened in the
1970s by the controversial decision of Roe v. Wade.3 I think it fair to
say that the question of judicial review has claimed more discussion
and more analysis than any other issue in constitutional law. These
lectures are an examination of this question. But they may strike some
as going about an answer in a rather odd and roundabout way, for it is
customary among essayists in constitutional law to address this ques-
tion directly, that is, by offering arguments which support or cast doubt
upon the exercise of this judicial power in various contexts. And yet
such legal arguments cannot, I think, establish an independent legiti-
macy for judicial review because they are themselves the products of
particular views of legitimacy. The debates and analyses are conducted
by means of arguments which themselves reflect a particular commit-
ment to one view of the basis for judicial review. It is because we are
already committed to the force of an appeal to text, for example, that
such an argument can be used in support of a court's role. When one
argues that a court's experience with parsing documents, its time for
reflection, or its relative insulation from political pressure fit it as an
institution for the task of assessing the constitutionality of legislation,
one is already committed to the view that enforcing rules derived from
the constitutional text is itself the legitimate task at hand. If you doubt
this, think of the kinds of arguments one does not hear-arguments
from religious texts, from determinism, or sheer power, as well as more
exotic appeals.
Therefore, in the ensuing hours, I will not take the conventional
tack of raising arguments that appear to define the scope of legitimate
review. Instead, I will present a taxonomy of those kinds of arguments
one encounters in judicial opinions, in hearings, and in briefs that con-
sider constitutional questions. Any of the classic forms of argument in
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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my list must be one with which you could agree, though you may, of
course, differ in your view of its force in a particular context. It is not
relevant, for the time being, whether constitutional arguments decide
cases, or are the decision itself, forming the structure of meaning the
case ultimately achieves as precedent. What is important at present is
that the Court hears arguments, reads arguments, and ultimately must
write arguments, all of which, as we shall see, occur within certain con-
ventions.
A. Historical Argument
The first of these approaches that I shall discuss is historical argu-
ment. Historical arguments depend on a determination of the original
understanding of the constitutional provision to be construed. At first,
notice how odd this is, that the original understanding of anything
should govern our present behavior. Certainly no one proposes an his-
torical argument in physics, that we should try, for example, to discover
what Democritus had in mind when he used the word "atom" so that
we may properly use that term when confronted with, say, the problem
of electron spin. Nor is anyone in the arts likely to argue that a particu-
lar artist must conceive his problem in terms dictated by his precursors.
Indeed, we reserve the epithet "derivative" for artists who do precisely
that. Of course, there is no text in the arts and sciences of the mid-
twentieth century, but to notice this is scarcely to explain the phenome-
non. It may be that there is no text simply because we doubt that exe-
gesis will work in the sciences or in the arts. Why do we think it will
work in constitutional law?
The American decision to produce a constitution in writing, a nov-
elty at the time, suggests an answer, one that finds expression in John
Adams" view that a "frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles
of the constitution. . . [is] absolutely necessary to preserve the advan-
tages of liberty and to maintain a free government. . . . The people
• . . have a right to require of their law givers and magistrates an exact
and constant observance of [these rules]." 4 This was the basis for the
very idea of an original understanding having force: that the Constitu-
tion bound government and that the People, therefore, had a right to
see that its limits and rules were observed. But what was the original
understanding of the use to be put of this original understanding? That
4. Quoted in R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 287 (1977). See also MASS. CONST.
OF 1780; Murphy, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J. 1752, 1763 n.60 (1978) (explaining that Adams'
words were "paraphrased in several other early state constitutions").
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is, what did the framers and ratifiers intend as to how their intentions
were to be determined?
We do not have an original commitment to a particular form of
historical argument. And thus we do not know to which source we are
to refer for the authoritative understanding. Whether we look to the
state ratifying conventions 5-whose votes were not taken on specific
provisions---or to the Constitutional Convention,6 which we must re-
member was not authorized to propose a new constitution,7 we encoun-
ter substantial obstacles. This may be in part because the records of the
debates are so scanty that full discussion of any point has been lost.
But it is also because the Convention met in secret without official min-
utes,' in an atmosphere that concealed dissent and put a premium on
achieving agreement to a document unglossed or unexplained in any
way that might disclose or provoke fissures in the coalitions which pro-
posed it.
Moreover, the debates in either state or national conventions can-
not operate affirmatively to establish the correctness of a particular
construction because they cannot establish why a coalition of states
adopted a particular measure. At best, they can only falsify a particu-
lar reading. For example, many of us have been called upon recently,
in our proper role as citizen-lawyers discussing the Constitution in our
communities, to consider the question whether a President may be im-
peached for acts that are politically repugnant to Congress though not
5. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 107-10 (1908).
6. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838). In another
case, having examined the "intention of the convention," the Court determined that framers
intended to confer a comprehensive taxing power to Congress, and therefore upheld a federal tax
on state-issued banknotes even though the effect was to drive those notes out of circulation, a
context not explicitly considered by the Convention. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533,
540-41 (1869). The Court has since resorted to the debates at the Convention to determine what
uniformity is required by the indirect tax provision, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I, Knowlton v.
Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 100 (1900), to allow a President to remove executive officers without congres-
sional consent, Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116-18 (1926), and to decide whether the
treason clause, U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3, cl. 1, prohibits the imputation of incriminating acts when
uncorroborated by two witnesses, Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 22-26 (1945). The Court
has relied on this sort of historical argument to support its view that congressional districts must
have a roughly equal population, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8-14 (1964), and its ruling that
Congress could not augment the constitutionally required qualifications for membership, Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 532-41 (1969). See also Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,
385-91 (1979); id. at 418-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The list might be expanded considerably,
in part because garnishing an opinion with historical arguments is usually considered a matter of
good taste. The interesting feature of such arguments in all these cases is, however, that not one
instance actually establishes the intent of the Convention, and usually when this is attempted it
has been refuted. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 98-110 (1962).
7. See H. HOCKETT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1776-1826, at
199 (1939).
8. 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at xi (rev. ed.
1966).
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of constitutional impact. The historical approach to this question
might frame the matter as "Did the framers intend by the phrase 'high
crimes and misdemeanors' 9 matters of political dispute between the
branches?" My answer is "no," and I may say this because this very
proposal was put forward by George Mason at the Convention, was the
subject of controversy in an exchange between Madison and Mason,
and was voted down."° But suppose it had been adopted. We would
not then have an equivalent assurance of determining intent, for while
a debate and vote can make it clear that a particular provision has been
severed from a rejected meaning, regardless of the delegates' reasons,
when a passage is adopted we are thrown back on the puzzle of vary-
ing, incompatible intentions that are unexpressed or, as in the case of
trade-offs for votes on other matters, indecisive. This asymmetricality,
this negativing role, has seldom been enough for the full-blown histori-
cist in constitutional law. He wants what none of the historical argu-
ments I have mentioned can give, and that is the authoritative reading
in a particular context.
It is worth spending a moment then on a particular variant of his-
torical argument that promises such certitude: This says, with Holmes,
that "we ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would
mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the
circumstances in which they were used."" This method, which con-
tracts scholars call, quite misleadingly, an "objective" method, frees us
from all the difficulties and paradoxes of intent. At a stroke, all of
these problems are brushed aside, and with them, of course, the nega-
tive, asymmetrical feature of historical argument. There is a true
meaning, on this view, and it is objective, an object the contours of
which we may discern by consulting the maps and photographs of the
day. It is an idea with roots in Luther Martin'" and Spencer Roane, 3
but which in our own day has been principally associated with William
Winslow Crosskey.
9. "The President ... shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
10. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 8, at 550.
11. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv. 417, 417-18 (1899). See,
e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); United States
v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 496 (1911); Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 206 (1904); 1 HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS 90 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
12. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 372-74 (1819) (Martin avers that
Congress had no implied power to charter a bank because "the scheme of the framers intended to
leave nothing to implication.").
13. See 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 808-09 (1953) (criticism by Judge Roane of Justice Marshall's historical arguments in
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816)).
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Crosskey was, by all accounts, an unusual, even eccentric man. He
was, according to Harry Kalven, "the stuff from which legends are
made,"' 4 and he seems to have been quite aware of this aspect. I re-
member his portrait on the walls of the Yale Law Journal-heavy set, a
balding head over a truculent scowl, his large frame crammed into a
small officer's chair; he obviously dominated that editorial board as he
dominated that photograph. After Yale, Crosskey clerked for Chief
Justice Taft and then went on to a Wall Street practice with Davis and
Polk. He was, as you might expect, personal assistant to John W. Da-
vis, the senior partner and one of the country's leading lawyers of the
period, and Davis is reported later to have said that Crosskey's brain
"was the best piece of legal equipment he had ever encountered."',5 In
1935 Crosskey accepted an offer from the University of Chicago Law
School where, it was thought, he might add a note of "professional-
ism," of the practitioner, to a faculty strongly theoretical. The faculty,
however, was shortly disabused of any such notions when his first
course, Federal Income and Estate Taxation, resolved into a study of
exclusively constitutional issues.' 6 For Crosskey was one of those bril-
liant men who is obsessed by the conviction that life is far simpler than
the nitwits running the world can perceive. With such iconoclasm it
was idle to suppose that he would attempt anything less than a revolu-
tion in constitutional scholarship. This effort resulted, sixteen years
later, in the two volumes we know as Politics and the Constitution.1'
This book is, I think all agree, a remarkable work. Its central the-
sis is that the Constitution established a government fully empowered
to accomplish the broad charter of the Preamble and not a government,
as has been generally thought, of limited, enumerated powers. The
Supreme Court, on this view, has a sharply circumscribed role of re-
view of congressional acts. The President is endowed with plenary au-
thority to ensure domestic tranquility. Congress is empowered to pass
all laws necessary and proper for the general welfare. It was, in short,
the constitution Franklin Roosevelt would have written in 1935.
How did Crosskey reach these surprising conclusions? Let me give
one example. In determining the scope of the commerce power, the
Supreme Court has construed the word "States" in the phrase from
article I, section 8, empowering Congress to regulate commerce among
14. Kalven, Our Man from Wall Street, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 229, 229 (1968).
15. Gregory, William Winslow Crosskey-As Z.Remember Him, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 243, 244
(1968).
16. Kalven, supra note 14, at 230.
17. W. CROSSKEY, supra note 13.
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the several states to mean "territorial divisions of the country" and has
thus contrived the doctrine of interstate commerce. 8 Crosskey argued,
with hundreds of accompanying citations, that the word "States" in the
commerce clause was understood in 1787 to refer to the "people of the
states."' 9 Therefore, Crosskey concluded, the Constitution granted
Congress plenary power to regulate all gainful activity. Using similar
methods on the basis of examples of word usage drawn from eighteenth
century newspapers, pamphlets, dictionaries, letters, diaries, and arti-
cles, Crosskey tried to recreate the legal and linguistic context within
which the Constitution was drafted. He expressed scorn for the idea
that the Constitution should change through time. "Did you ever see a
living document?"2 he would growl to his classes.
How could these meanings have been so utterly lost during the
first decades of constitutional construction by the Supreme Court?
Crosskey proposed this startling answer: James Madison had tampered
with the notes he kept of the constitutional debates-Madison had the
only set-and had released them when all other members of the Con-
vention had died.2 ' This deception was advanced by the complicity of
Jeffersonian Justices on the Supreme Court who, from a date early in
Marshall's tenure, began systematically painting glosses on the true
meaning of the constitutional text. So it was that the true Constitution
became, in Crosskey's phrase, the "unknown" Constitution.22
What was the reaction to these charges and this remarkable attack
on constitutional argument as practiced? Initially, it was very
favorable indeed. "This remarkable work sweeps away acres of non-
sense that have been written about the Constitution," wrote the promi-
nent historian Arthur Schlesinger, Sr.23 "It is perhaps," he continued,
"the most fertile commentary on that document since the Federalist
Papers ... ."24 And even Arthur Corbin, who had taught us all that
the intention of the parties was but a single element in the complex
decision whether to enforce a contract, approved the great length de-
voted "to the language of the time in which the Constitution was writ-
ten and was first interpreted."25
18. Id. at 50.
19. Id. at 77.
20. Krash, William Winslow Crosskey, 35 U. CH. L. REv. 232, 234 (1968).
21. See 1 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 13, at 7.
22. Id. at 11.
23. Rheinstein, Book Review, 2 U. Cm. L. ScH. REc. No. 2, at 6 (1953) (quoting Schles-
inger).
24. Id.
25. Corbin, Book Review, 2 U. Cm. L. SCH. REc. No. 3, at 14 (1954). See also Corbin, Book
Review, 62 YALE L.J. 1137 (1953).
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For a year the first two volumes of Politics and the Constitution-
two more were projected-were the major event in constitutional schol-
arship. The books were reviewed thirty-six times in law reviews and
journals; the Chicago Press went into a second printing. But then the
pendulum began to swing.
A favorable review by Malcolm Sharp in the Columbia Law Re-
view2 6 was followed by a bewildered notice in the same Review by Ir-
ving Brant, 27 Madison's biographer: "In spite of appalling
misrepresentations," Brant wrote, with the tone of the mouse who has
encountered the badger, "there is a vast amount of sound reasoning in
Mr. Crosskey's work."2 This was in March of 1954. Then in June of
that year two further reviews appeared, both in the Harvard Law Re-
view, which had hitherto been silent. The first, by Ernest Brown,29 pro-
ceeds on several fronts. Contemporary letters by Washington and
Jefferson are quoted to establish the Federalist Papers as true reflec-
tions of the Convention's understanding. More damning is Brown's
use of Crosskey's own method. The words "among" and "several," as
well as others, are examined for their eighteenth century usage and
shown, predictably, to have had several meanings, some of which are
compatible with the conventional Constitution and none of which com-
pels the Crosskey revision.30 Even more damaging, however, was the
review that followed, a lengthy analysis of Crosskey's thesis about judi-
cial review, written by Henry Hart.3 ' Professor Crosskey, Hart wrote in
an unforgettable passage, is "a devotee of that technique of interpreta-
tion which reaches its apogee of persuasiveness in the triumphant ques-
tion, 'If that's what they meant, why didn't they say so?' "32 With this
remark Hart served notice that he had no intention of adopting the
variant of historical argument that Crosskey had used. The remainder
of the review is revealing of the way in which Hart used a different
approach--one I have called doctrinal argument 33-- to attack Cross-
key's thesis.
After the Hart review much of the furor around Crosskey sub-
sided. He had promised two more volumes that would vindicate his
analyses and further substantiate Madison's perfidy, but advancing
26. Sharp, Book Review, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 439 (1954).
27. Brant, Book Review, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 443 (1954).
28. Id. at 450.
29. Brown, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. Rv. 1439 (1954).
30. See, e.g., id. at 1449-51.
31. Hart, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1456, 1457 (1954).
32. Id. at 1462.
33. See text accompanying notes 55-78 infra.
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years and illness prevented this. Of Max Rheinstein's claim only a year
before that "[1]awyers will use [Crosskey's book] in argument, judges
will have to discuss it, historians will have to test it, politicians will
draw upon or inveigh against it"3 4-- of all this came nothing. It has
been cited only once in the text of an opinion for the Court and this for
a trivial point.35 It has, with its brilliant and eccentric author, sunk
beneath the waves of our constitutional consciousness. Why did this
happen? In part because the problem with which Crosskey began in
1937, the constitutional crisis resulting from the frustration of the New
Deal Congress by the Supreme Court, was largely solved by the very
methods that Crosskey despised, and by the institution whose role he
wished to limit. And new problems engaged the legal culture, not the
least of which were those stemming from a case handed down at about
the same time as Henry Hart's review, Brown v. Board of Education.36
In that case, you will recall, the Court, after having requested briefs
from both sides on the question of the original understanding of the
fourteenth amendment, offered only a single paragraph on this subject
in the opinion. The historical arguments were, Chief Justice Warren
wrote, "[a]t best . . . inconclusive."37
Crosskey's enterprise, the escape from inconclusiveness, was
doomed. He died in 1968, in Connecticut, not far from the place of his
early triumphs. But the argument--the variant I have typed of the his-
torical approach-lives on, promising a sloughing off of generations of
wrong living and a return to simple rules straightforwardly applied.
And thus, it was with recognition that I read the jacket blurb to the
historicist Raoul Berger's book, Impeachment:38  "An admirable and
powerful book, [it is] valuable and illuminating." It was signed, of
course, by the prominent historian, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
34. Rheinstein, supra note 23, at 16.
35. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, Tax Comm'r, 423 U.S. 276, 290-91 (1976). The citation
appears within a discussion of the meaning of the Import-Export Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10,
cl. 2. The Court later questioned even the inconsequential proposition for which Crosskey was
earlier cited. Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 760
n.26 (1978). In addition to its appearance in these two cases, Crosskey's work is cited in only three
other opinions, all in dissent. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 n.18 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 476 n.6 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Marcello v.
Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 319 (1955) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
36. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37. Id. at 489.
38. R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973).
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B. Textual Argument
In contrast to, but often confused with, historical arguments, are
textual arguments. Justice Story shows the distinction ably.
Mr. Jefferson has laid down [what he deems a perfect canon] for
the interpretation of the constitution. . . . "On every question of
construction [we should] carry ourselves back to the time, when
the constitution was adopted; recollect the spirit manifested in the
debates; and. . . conform to the probable one, in which it was
passed." Now, who does not see the utter. . . incoherence of this
canon. . . .Is the sense of the constitution to be ascertained...
by conjectures from scattered documents, from private papers,
from the table talk of some statesmen... ? ...It is obvious,
that there can be no security to the people in any constitution of
government, if they are not to judge of it by the fair meaning of
the words of the text. .. .
Why is this? Why should we be limited to a recourse to text when
collateral sources may identify the intention of the framers or ratifiers?
Because, as Story put it, "Constitutions. . .are instruments of a practi-
cal nature . . .fitted for common understandings. The people make
them; the people adopt them; the people must be supposed to read
them ...; and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite
meaning. .... -
If historical arguments draw legitimacy from an assumed original
position and the social contract then negotiated, textual arguments are
not simply this source with the parol evidence rule strictly applied. In-
stead, they rest on a sort of ongoing social contract, in which the terms
are given contemporary meanings. Story believed that this constrained
judges, 41 and I am inclined to think he was right. One cannot appeal to
superior learning to establish the meaning of a common phrase. To the
textualist, the eighteenth century dictionary is as illegitimate as the
twentieth century Brookings pamphlet.
In our lifetimes the principal exponent of this view was the long
Senior Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Hugo Black. Justice
Black was of a type not infrequently seen in American law. Hostile to
intellectuals and big businessmen alike, he regarded himself as a self-
made man. He read the classics-by which he meant the Greek histori-
ans and Shakespeare-and, again true to type, doted on Jefferson and
Madison. Largely self-educated, he relished telling the story of how on
39. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrrTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 407, at 390
n.1 (Boston 1833).
40. Id. § 451, at 436-37.
41. See id. §§ 450-452.
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the Senate floor he had pinned an opposing member with a passage
quoted from the "Fallacies of the Anti-Reformers," volume 27 of the
Harvard Classics.42 How many men the South has produced who have
intensely held a Hobbesian view of the conflicts in life and, at the same
time, passionately idealized the common man.
Yet Hugo Black was not merely of a type. For in addition to his
manic self-improvement and invincible provincialism, he was one thing
none of his colleagues were: Black was a genius, with a grasp of the
effect of simplicity in the law, of the need for it, and an understanding
of how to make his contemporaries feel that need. It was this under-
standing that animated and gave a power to textualism that it had not
had since the Marshall Court. It was Hugo Black who led constitu-
tional argument out of the wilderness of legal realism. The means for
doing this was the textual argument.
The principal crisis of legitimacy for judicial review in this century
is thought to have occurred in the years from 1932 to 1937 when the
Supreme Court, in a number of reactionary, five-four decisions, struck
down New Deal measures as unconstitutional. In response to this frus-
tration of national purpose, President Roosevelt proposed the Court-
Packing Plan, which would have added members to the Supreme Court
and, presumably, changed outcomes in future cases. The events of that
spring and summer of 1937 are familiar, culminating in the dramatic
shift by Justice Owen Roberts in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. , Which began the series of validations of New Deal legislation.
The death of the Court bill followed quickly, it having, many observed,
served its purpose. At the time, T.R. Powell quoted Fielding: "'[H]e
• . .would have ravished her, if she had not, by a timely compliance,
prevented him.' "I4
Actually, I think the crisis had a somewhat different form than all
that; or perhaps I have in mind a different crisis. The real constitu-
tional crisis of the 1930s was begun by Holmes, not by Sutherland, and
it consisted principally in the tension between legal realism-which as-
serts that there are no discernible, nonformal legal rules of any signifi-
cance-and the democratic faith in law, which depends on the
transmutation of political conflict into legal problems when issues of
constitutional importance are involved.
42. H. BLACK, JR., My FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 160 (1975).
43. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
44. T.R. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19-20
(1956) (quoting H. FIELDING, THE HISTORY OF THE LIFE OF MR. JONATHAN WILD THE GREAT
bk. III, ch. vii (London 1743)).
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The real crisis, then, was in the disillusionment which followed the
realization that law was made by the Court. "[N]ow with the shift by
Roberts," then-Professor Frankfurter had written President Roosevelt,
"even a blind man ought to see that the Court is in politics, and under-
stands how the Constitution is 'judicially' construed. '45 It was this cri-
sis that Senator Black had done his share to bring about and to whose
resolution he devoted his judicial life.
Black developed the textual argument, and a set of supporting
doctrines, with a simplicity and power they had never had. His essen-
tial idea was that the Constitution has a number of significant prohibi-
tions which, when phrased without qualification, bar any extension of
governmental power to those areas. A judge need not decide whether
such an extension is wise or prudent; and in so refraining, he is, there-
fore, a mere conduit for the prohibitions of the Constitution. He is not,
as the realists charged, enforcing his own views-indeed, he may some-
times be in the exquisite position of affirming legislation hostile to his
own views-and, moreover, he is acting on a basis readily apprehensi-
ble by the people at large, namely, giving the common-language mean-
ings to provisions in the Constitution. This allowed Black to restore to
judicial review the popular perception of legitimacy that the New Deal
crisis had threatened.
But here, let me give you a scene of Black in action. In the follow-
ing passage you will hear Black espousing the approach of textual argu-
ment, as well as expressing some corollaries that follow from it and aid
its implementation in constitutional law. CBS News is the interlocutor.
The last time, ironically, a sitting Justice had appeared in his study for
a prime-time broadcast had been the radio greeting by Holmes on the
occasion of his ninetieth birthday in 1931.
The CBS reporter asks what reason Black has for arguing that
there are absolute prohibitions on government. Black replies:
Well, I'll read you the part of the first amendment that caused me
to say there are absolutes in our Bill of Rights .... Now, if a
man were to say this to me out on the street, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion"-that's the
first amendment-I would think: Amen, Congress should pass
no law. Unless they just didn't know the meaning of words.
That's what they mean to me. Certainly they mean that liter-
ally.4
It was Black who developed the doctrine of the incorporation of the
45. ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER 392 (Freedman ann. ed. 1967).
46. Justice Black and the Bill a/fRghts, 9 Sw. U.L. Rev. 937, 938 (1977) (transcript of CBS
News Special, broadcast Dec. 3, 1968).
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Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment.47 This device was cru-
cial to the textual approach, since the language of the fourteenth
amendment by itself is too sparse to provide the common phrases on
which the textualist relies. Here is Black defending this incorporation;
I think you will see his larger motives:
[I apply, by incorporation in the fourteenth amendment, the fifth
amendment, which says that no person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself.] And the theory-opposite to mine-has
been the fact that's bad and it's unlawful, the Constitution pre-
vents it, is not because it's in the fifth amendment. Well, if it's
not because it's in the fifth amendment, where does it come from?
Is it the mind of the judge? In other words, is he going to fix
limits to the Constitution? I don't see that. I don't think I have
that power. And I wouldn't do it. .... I've sustained laws as
constitutional that I was bitterly against-didn't agree with
them.48
One corollary to the textual approach is a disregard of precedent.
Thus, Black says to a somewhat alarmed Eric Sevareid: "I think it's my
obligation to take this Constitution-I don't care what anybody else
has decided-that's immaterial. ' 49 After all, not only can I, today, give
as valid a reading to a text as someone twenty years ago, I can perhaps
give a better one in the sense of one that better comports with the words
as commonly understood today. It was at this point, as if to dramatize
the textual perspective, that Justice Black produced from his coat pock-
et a small copy of the Constitution, which he said he always carried
with him in order to use the text precisely and not in paraphrase.50
Black made no mention in these remarks of collateral sources as
aids in interpreting the text-no discussions of the controversies that
swirled around particular passages at the time of their adoption, or of
the inconvenient fact that segregation, school prayer, and capital pun-
ishment were ongoing and unchallenged at the time the amendments
were adopted. Thus, one power of the textual argument is that it pro-
vides a valve by which contemporary values can be intermingled with
the Constitution. The contemporary understanding of the word "com-
merce," for example, is far more comprehensive, and hence more
promising as a source of national power, than it was a century ago,
reflecting perhaps our more interconnected economy as well as our
awareness of that interconnectedness. But at the same time, we have
only to recall Justice Black's consistent dissents from the Court's efforts
47. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
48. Justice Black and the Bill of Rtghts, supra note 46, at 938.
49. Id. at 939.
50. Id.
710
Vol. 58:695, 1980
Constitutional Fate
to include wiretaps within the fourth amendment51 to observe the stul-
tifying rigidity of textual arguments.
It is thrilling to see Justice Black taking a swing at the Gordian
knot of economic due process by suggesting that corporations are not
"persons" within the fourteenth amendment. 2 And certainly the man
on the street would be inclined to agree. But would a lawyer, accus-
tomed to the distinction between natural and non-natural persons?
And if a lawyer would not, why not? Is it not because the uses to which
lawyers have put the word "person" include purposes for which they
wish to treat corporations as responsible entities with all the liability
and proprietary characteristics of natural persons-and if this is so, it
represents a choice about how to use the law, a choice from which the
meaning of the word follows, not one that it anticipates. It was no idle
sneer that T.R. Powell offered in the mid-40s, that Justice Black "sets
before himself the ideal of writing judicial opinions so that they can be
understood by intelligent laymen. ' 53 This was the fundamental criti-
cism leveled by the Realist: that words, like rules, cannot lead to E
decision by those who are themselves required to give content to the
words. 4
But I am ahead of my story. Let us return to the incident of crisis
in 1937, out of which Hugo Black emerged as Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, taking the seat promised by the President to the Sena-
tor who led the Court-Packing Plan. That crisis will illuminate for us
other constitutional approaches tried by the Court.
C. Doctrinal Argument
Did the imminent threat of the Court-Packing Plan and Franklin
Roosevelt's overwhelming victory in the 1936 election cause Owen
Roberts to abandon the Court's conservative bloc and vote to uphold
New Deal statutes and social welfare legislation in the states? Was it in
fact, in the cruel phrase often attributed to Powell, "the switch in time
that saved nine"? Roberts was greatly stung by this accusation. The
substance of the charge is this: In June 1936, Roberts joined the five-
man majority in the T7valdo5  case, which reaffirmed the holding in
51. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 70 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
52. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85-90 (1938) (Black, J., dissent-
ing).
53. Powell, Insurance as Commerce, 57 HARv. L. REv. 937, 982 (1944).
54. See, e.g., T.R. POWELL, supra note 44, at 26-28.
55. Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
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Adkins,56 one of the old Court's most retrograde decisions, and thereby
struck down New York's minimum wage law. But then, in March
1937, Justice Roberts changed sides in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Par-
rish.5 7 His vote gave the four Tpaldo dissenters a new majority that
flatly overruled Adkins and sustained minimum wage legislation for
the first time.
Roberts was deeply hurt by the accepted gossip that he had
switched sides in response to Roosevelt's threats and successes. He pre-
pared a memorandum for Felix Frankfurter, doubtless intending that it
be published posthumously-as it was 54-in which he endeavored to
exculpate himself. In it Roberts said that he had been willing to over-
rule Adkins at the time of T#7aldo, but because counsel had tried
merely to distinguish Adkins, he decided simply to concur with the ma-
jority. When the Parrish case arose, he voted to hear the case because
Adkins was there "definitely assailed and the Court was [being] asked
to. . .overrule it."59 This vote, plus the fact that it was Stone's illness
which actually delayed an opinion until after the election, made evi-
dent, in Roberts' words, "that no action taken by the President in the
interim had any causal relation to my action in the Parrish case." 60
But since the Washington Supreme Court had sustained the stat-
ute, the meaning of Roberts' vote to note probable jurisdiction is at best
ambiguous. And while it is true that the conference vote on the merits
in December did antedate Roosevelt's submission to Congress of the
Court Plan, it followed by a month and a half the election and the
President's public indication that T#7aldo was "the final irritant.'
Even to a. sympathetic reader, Roberts' memorandum is unconvincing.
But the important question here is why did Roberts care one way
or the other? The answer is that Roberts was deeply committed to doc-
trinal argument and to the aesthetic of the doctrinal position. In the
Anglo-American tradition, this aesthetic is loosely called "the rule of
law." It is addressed principally to judges and depends on at least two
clear distinctions. First, legislative policymaking must be distinguished
from judicial rule-applying. Second, judicial rule-applying must be a
reasoned process of deriving the appropriate rules and of following
them in deciding a practical controversy between adverse parties, with-
56. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
57. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
58. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 310, 314-15 (1955).
59. Id. at 315.
60. Id.
61. J. ALSOP & T. CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS 18 (1938).
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out regard to any fact not relevant to the rules, as, for example, the
status or ultimate purposes of the parties.
Roberts' switch for political reasons would have violated both ca-
nons of doctrinal argument. It would have been legislative rather than
judicial; it would not have been based on neutral principles of general
rather than ad hoc application. But where do the doctrinalist's general
principles come from? In the answer to this question lies the unique
character of doctrinal argument in our day. The legal realists had
erased the background assumed to yield such principles by showing
that general principles could not be derived satisfactorily simply by
stare decisis and that substantive law was, if it was to be rational, nec-
essarily purposive and selected, rather than derived. Thus, doctrinal
argument, as we know it today, is a response to realism that seeks to
preserve the aesthetic of the rule of law. The late Professor Henry Hart
was its chief theoretician, and his great works, about which I shall say
more, have dominated the discussion of constitutional law for the last
quarter-century.
Hart's answer to the realist question, and his reformulation of doc-
trinal argument, changed the matrix from the application of preceden-
tial, substantive rules to the rules of precedential process. It's not what
judges do, Hart told us, its's how they do it.
The ideology of doctrinal argument finds its fullest expression in
the most influential casebook in constitutional law, Hart and Wechs-
ler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System,62 which, naturally
enough, focuses on the methods by which state and federal courts de-
cide who will decide, how decision is to be reached, what authority it
will have, and so forth. This extraordinary work is perhaps the most
influential casebook ever written. It is the one most frequently cited by
the Supreme Court both generally and in constitutional opinions.63
During the same time that the work has enjoyed its astonishing
success, however, the Supreme Court has moved further and further
away from the principal premise of doctrinal argument and of the Hart
and Wechsler casebook: the notion that the judicial function with re-
spect to the Constitution is essentially a common law function, arising
from the Court's common law process governing private litigants. The
various process doctrines that flow from this conception of the Court's
role-justiciability, mootness, meticulous attention to stare decisis, and
the formulation of neutral principles-have been considerably on the
62. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (lst ed.
1953).
63. As of April 30, 1979, fifty-seven opinions of the Supreme Court had cited this casebook.
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decline. This drift away from doctrine has been the occasion for a
number of violent attacks on the Court. Hart's own Foreword to the
Harvard Law Review's 1959 issue on the Supreme Court' is the para-
digm for these assaults.
This essay, entitled The Time Chart ofthe Justices, is divided into
two sections. In the first, a sort of armchair arithmetizing of the hours
for discussion and opinion-writing available to the Justices, Hart
counts up the numbers of cert. petitions, dissents, holidays, and so on,
arriving at a hypothetical allocation of the 1532 hours in each Justice's
working year. Hart decides, for example, that 372 hours are devoted to
"collective deliberation."65 He concludes that the Justices are much
overworked.6 6 What is the point of this bizarre exercise? It is to excuse
the Justices from the second portion of the essay, which is a savage
attack on the intellectual and moral quality of their opinions. These
opinions, Hart writes, "lack the underpinning of principle which is nec-
essary to . ..exemplify . .. the rule of law .... Only opinions
which are grounded in reason" can be applied by lower courts.67 And
only such opinions will be legitimate. It is a powerful exposition of the
doctrinal position. But the essay also reveals something of the flaws of
the doctrinal approach.
Doctrinal argument assumes the Court has but one function when,
in fact, the Supreme Court properly exercises a family of functions.68
And doctrinal argument treats the Supreme Court as though it were
merely the last, best appellate tribunal. For example, Hart bitterly
complains that the Supreme Court of that period insisted on reversing
lower court findings69 in workmen's compensation cases.7" He criti-
cized this as an unprincipled deviation from the rule that appellate
courts reexamine only legal and not factual findings. It looked as
though the only principle the Court was applying was "employees
win." It looked this way because the commentators and the appellate
courts examined the FELA statute through the doctrinal glasses of
classical negligence law,71 while the statute, as the Supreme Court read
it, really could not be fitted within conventional negligence doctrine.
This does not mean, as doctrinalists would suggest, that there is no
64. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1938 Term-Foreword" The Time Chart of the Justices, 73
HARv. L. REv. 84 (1959).
65. Id. at 86.
66. Id. at 99-101.
67. Id. at 99.
68. See part III infra.
69. See, e.g., Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).
70. Hart, supra note 64, at 96-97.
71. See id. at 97 n.29.
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principle. It means that radical departure from doctrine necessarily ap-
pears unprincipled from the perspective of the doctrine it replaces. The
presumption that employees win is a principle; indeed, it is a key prin-
ciple in the doctrine of strict liability.
Hart's Foreword reflects other biases of doctrinal argument. For
one thing, it depends on descriptions of both the world and the consti-
tutional world that are far from evident. Doctrinal argument assumes
dispassionate, disinterested judges who arrive at decision by the process
of reason applied to doctrine. But Justices of the Supreme Court, as
Thurman Arnold pointed out,72 are far more likely to have deep con-
victions on the political issues of the day than are the rest of us. And
although, as one would expect, the doctrinal ideology seeks to keep
cases of political significance out of the courts, no one can doubt,
whether approving or disapproving, that the Court is one of our princi-
pal political actors. If the FELA cases reflect a shift in favor of the
workingman, this was in turn a reflection of Roosevelt's legislative pro-
grams and his appointments to the Court.
Ignoring this accounts, in part, for the absolute confidence with
which Hart writes. As was true of lawyers of the late nineteenth cen-
tury, conclusions inescapably emerge for him. This assurance is ac-
complished only if focus is greatly narrowed and the kinds of legitimate
argument reduced to one. Thus, Hart's process of collective decision-
making does not sound like the description we have of the Court's Fri-
day conferences. It sounds instead more like the world of the Harvard
Law Review: with industrious but largely convictionless students arriv-
ing at results.
Doctrinal argument faces its true crisis when the old purposes for
the development of the doctrine have been obscured or mooted, or
have simply withered away, and when there is no consensus as to the
discernible purpose. For it is the reasoning from purpose that gives
doctrinalism its power. It cannot provide purpose, and the debate over
purposes is generally the issue in constitutional law.
A poignant example of this dilemma occurred, not in a judicial
opinion, but in one series of the Holmes Lectures at Harvard. I do not
mean Wechsler's famous Neutral Principles lectures,73 though they are
an influential exposition of doctrinal argument, 4 nor Judge Friendly's
72. Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1298, 1313-14 (1960).
73. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959),
reprinted in H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3 (1961).
74. See generaly Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169 (1968); Pollak, RacialDiscrimination and
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Holmes Lectures, appropriately entitled The Federal Administrative
Agencies: The Needfor Better Definition of Standards,75 but Hart's own
lectures delivered in 1963. Hart began by examining the premise of
much of social science that estimations of value and fact should be sep-
arated.76 This he rejected, since that separation would deny us the abil-
ity to decide whether legal decisions were sound, who ought to make
them, what values they should reflect. This was Hart's erie de coeur
against legal realism. The second lecture was devoted to a sort of meta-
anthropological essay.77 Reasoning from the assumption that human
wants can be satisfied only in the association of human beings, Hart
concluded that a legal system is necessary to secure the benefits of so-
cial living. Thus, we may deduce that a going society, with the purpose
of securing to itself the benefits of social living, requires mutual for-
bearance of aggression, some faith in the promises of others, some min-
imal recognition of the security of property-in short, the basic
doctrines of the common law.
Hart began his third lecture by saying: "Suppose we were to de-
cide that the commitments in the Constitution mean that every Ameri-
can is entitled. . . to an equal opportunity to develop and to exercise
his capacities as a responsible human being. . . and that the overrid-
ing purpose of all actions taken by the authority of society ... is to
make that opportunity as meaningful as possible. 7 8 If we accept this
value, it then becomes possible to choose the means of reaching this
end through reason. Then Hart paused, and when he continued he said
he had realized, on the very eve of the lecture, that he could not offer a
general resolution, that he could give no principle by which such values
could be arrived at. His answers were, he now saw, less conclusive than
he had hoped. And then, in a hushed and crowded Ames courtroom,
halfway through the period allotted to his lecture, he sat down. In this
moving anecdote we confront the integrity and the impotence of doctri-
nal argument.
D. Prudential Argument
A bit before Hart delivered his Holmes Lectures, Justice Black
spoke at New York University, giving the first James Madison Lec-
Judicial ntegrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1(1959); see also A. BICKEL,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 81 (lst ed. 1970).
75. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Needfor Better Definition of Stand-
ards (pts. 1-3), 75 HARv. L. REV. 863, 1055, 1263 (1962).
76. Henry Hart Converses on Law and Justice, HARv. L. REc., Feb. 28, 1963, at 7.
77. Id. at 7-8.
78. Id. at 8.
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ture.7 9 There he offered, in contrast to his own textual approach, an-
other approach that he derided as dangerous to the Constitution. This
I will call the prudential approach. Referring to the text of the last
clause of the fifth amendment-the prohibition against taking private
property without just compensation-Justice Black constructed an im-
aginary opinion that he attributed to Judge X. This opinion, in pom-
pous and convoluted tones-for Black was a master of ridicule--came
to the conclusion that the Defense Department might seize a family
farm without paying compensation since the takings clause in the fifth
amendment must be balanced against the provision for the war power
in article I, and, there being competing texts, the balance had to be
struck as a matter of prudence, a calculation of the necessity of the act
and its great benefits against the small harm incidentally worked.8 0
The kind of argument that Justice Black is ridiculing is prudential
argument, and Judge X is, if anyone does not know, Justice Frank-
furter.81 The contrast with textual argument is sharp-as Black's acid
pen makes clear-because, in constitutional questions, competing texts
can almost always be found, and if a prudential approach is used to
decide between them, then they really count for nothing in the decision.
Prudential argument is constitutional argument actuated by the politi-
cal and economic circumstances surrounding the decision. Thus,
prudentialists generally hold that, in times of national emergency, even
the plainest of constitutional limitations can be ignored. Perhaps
others share that belief; but the prudentialist makes it a legitimate legal
argument, fits it into opinions, and uses it as the purpose for doctrines,
and it is this that makes him interesting to us.
In our time the most eloquent and creative exponent of prudential
argument was Alexander Bickel. I knew him very slightly just before
and during his tragic dying. Like his mentor, Felix Frankfurter, Bickel
was short and slight and dressed in a dapper, elegant way. Like him
also, he had been brought to the United States as a child, had excelled
at City College, and had gone on to excel at Harvard Law School. It is
fair, I think, to characterize Justice Frankfurter, for whom Bickel
clerked, as Bickel's jurisprudential progenitor. But the line begins-as
does the modem era of prudential argument-with Louis Brandeis.
Therefore, it is pleasing that we may observe the first significant ex-
79. Black, The Bill ofRights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960).
80. Id. at 877-78.
81. Black disclaimed any perfect correspondence between life and art by saying, at the end of
the imaginary opinion: "Of course, I would not decide this case this way nor do I think any other
judge would so decide it today." Id. at 878.
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pression of modem prudentialism in constitutional law in a memoran-
dum by Brandeis, collected in a volume by Bickel,82 to whom Brandeis'
papers had been entrusted by their executor, Frankfurter.
This memorandum was written about Atherton Mills v. Johnston,83
a little known case decided the same day as the Child Labor Tax
Case. 4 It presented the same statute for challenge, 5 but was handled
in conventional terms of mootness in a brief opinion by Taft. Atherton
Mills arose in this way. The father of a child employed by a mill had
complained that the mill was about to discharge the boy to avoid trig-
gering the ten percent tax on profits derived from child labor. The fa-
ther argued that the statute which imposed the tax damaged him by
threatening to deprive him of his son's earnings. 86
In a draft opinion labeled a memorandum to the Court, Brandeis
urged dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that
since the mill could always fire the boy for any reason, the Court could
not remedy the alleged loss even if it struck down the statute.8 7 The
Court should not interfere with the political process when it could rea-
sonably avoid doing so. Brandeis believed the Court should avoid con-
stitutional decision when grounds such as these were available in order
to safeguard the Court's own position and to activate the political
processes of the legislature. These are not textual, historical, or even
doctrinal reasons, though they are sometimes embodied in doctrine.
They are prudential reasons. The memorandum was convincing
enough at least to persuade his colleagues to hold the decision in Ather-
ton Mills over for a Term. By focusing discussion on the issue of juris-
diction, Brandeis avoided a collision with his colleagues on the merits.
Moreover, he isolated an area in which the Court could speak with
utter finality, not dependent on other branches of government or other
courts to give its decision effect. For the Court, declining jurisdiction is
thus uniquely suited as a weapon of self-defense.
With the Atherton Mills memorandum, Brandeis had gained a toe-
hold for a position of considerable importance on a Court in which he
was doomed to sit in the minority. Even on reargument, when the So-
licitor General intervened to urge the constitutionality of the Act but
82. A. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 13-14 (1st Phoenix
ed. 1967).
83. 259 U.S. 13 (1922).
84. 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
85. Revenue Act of 1918 (Child Labor Tax Act), Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1138 (1919).
86. 259 U.S. at 14.
87. A. BICKEL, supra note 82, at 8-9.
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refused to press the jurisdictional issue,88 despite, it is said, helpful and
finally exasperated prodding from Brandeis, even then the Court still
did not decide. Finally young Johnston reached age sixteen, and the
statute no longer applied. The case was mooted. 89 But the groundwork
had been laid for Brandeis' development of the jurisdictional doctrines
by which prudence was brought to bear in determining when the Court
should act. Indeed, afterward, Brandeis would cite the Taft opinion in
Atherton Mills for this very point,9" inexplicably to an observer limited
to the pages of the United States Reports.
Brandeis' campaign for prudentialism culminated in his majestic
concurrence in Ashwander9 l fourteen years later, in which he gave an
authoritative list of the occasions when the Court should refuse juris-
diction.92 "The most important thing we do," said Brandeis, "is not
doing. '93 The means of avoiding decisions are so important, wrote
Bickel of this famous phrase, because they "are the techniques that al-
low leeway to expediency." 94
This discussion should establish the important position the Ather-
ton Mills memorandum and the later Ashwander opinion occupy in
constitutional law. The former is a prudential argument-such are
common in all conferences, at all times-cast in the form of a draft
opinion. And the latter is an opinion seized as an opportunity, as all
concurrences are. By this route, prudential argument became legiti-
mate constitutional argument. It moved from the cloakroom and the
private conversations of worldly men into opinions, as reasons that
might support a judicial decision.
Bickel gave the fullest expression of the prudential approach to
constitutional law in his celebrated essay, The Passive Virtues.95 This
subtle and ingenious work details the use of various jurisdictional doc-
trines as mediating devices by which the Court can introduce political
realities into its decisional process. Prudential approaches are efforts to
bring to constitutional decision, in Frankfurter's words, "[t]he impact
88. Id. at 18-19.
89. 259 U.S. at 15.
90. Chastelton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 549 n.1 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Penn-
sylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 611 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Stone
shared Brandeis' view of Atherton Mills. See CIO v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 472,475 (1945); Coffman
v. Breeze Corps., 323 U.S. 316, 324 (1945).
91. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 346-48.
93. Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations (unpublished manuscript in Harvard Law School
Library), quoted in A. BICKEL, supra note 82, at 17.
94. A. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 71.
95. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword" The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L.
REv. 40 (1961); A. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 111.
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of actuality."96 It is instructive to compare this feature with doctrinal
argument, which is typically used in an effort to escape the impress of
particular facts to get to the common high ground of principle. For
Bickel, by contrast:
The accomplished fact, affairs and interests that have formed
around it, and perhaps popular acceptance of it-these are ele-
ments . . . that may properly enter into a decision to abstain
from rendering constitutional judgment or to allow room and
time for accomodation to such a judgment; and they may also
enter into the shaping of the judgment, the applicable principle
itself.97
Of course, this scarcely squares with the aloof detachment of doc-
trinal argument, and so, following the publication of an expanded ver-
sion of The Passive Virtues in The Least Dangerous Branch,9" Bickel
was sharply rebuked in the Columbia Law Review99 by Gerald Gun-
ther, who is, today, the principle proponent of doctrinalism in constitu-
tional law. Bickel, Gunther wrote in a telling and brilliant phrase,
demanded "100% insistence on principle, 20% of the time."" Gunther
correctly saw that Bickel's approach "would endorse conjecture about
the complexities of political reactions as a primary ingredient of Court
deliberations."10'
Bickel responded to this attack in his Holmes Lectures of 1969.102
There Bickel reviewed the work of the Warren Court and stood back a
moment from the fork in the road to which constitutional prudential
argument had brought him. The most important decisions of the era,
Bickel argued-on school segregation, discrimination in housing, the
poll tax, racially-limited juries, and others--could not be justified by
resort to doctrine or to any truly neutral principles.10 3 The Warren
Court found its justification in a particular political vision of progress.
If they were right, as Jan Deutsch has pointed out," 4 then history will
ratify their decisions and these will come to be seen as resting on "neu-
tral" principles. 5
96. Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REv. 1002, 1006 (1924).
97. A. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 116.
98. Id.
99. Gunther, The Subtle Vices ofthe "Passive Virtues'-A Comment on Princoile and Expedi-
ency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1964).
100. Id. at 3.
101. Id. at 7.
102. A. BICKEL, supra note 74.
103. See, e.g., id. at 99.
104. See Deutsch, Harvard's View ofThe Supreme Court: A Response, 57 TExAs L. REv. 401
(1979); Deutsch, supra note 55.
105. See A. BICKEL, supra note 74, at 99-100.
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But Bickel would not take this course, though he was scarcely in-
sensitive to its appeal. Of prudential argument Bickel could say only
that his use of it allowed the Court to avoid going in the direction it did
not want to go and allowed an accommodation with other branches,
also deciding prudentially." 6 Bickel would not go further. He wished
to be principled, even if, as he wrote of Edmund Burke, "one of his
principles was the principle that on most occasions in politics principle
must not be allowed to be controlling."'0 7 He would not support af-
firmative, rather than passive, programmatic, rather than institutional,
prudentialism. This next step was left to his successors, of whom
Guido Calabresi, who dedicated his Holmes Lectures in 1977108 to
Bickel, and Bruce Ackerman, whose Private Property and the Constitu-
tion'0 9 is an extended treatment of a constitutional issue from a pru-
dential perspective and which is itself also dedicated to Bickel, are
perhaps the most prominent.
What Bickel recognized-and what Gunther was at pains to dis-
pute-was that the Court has an enormous influence on events when it
declines to strike down a law and that this influence is by no means the
same as that produced when the Court declines to discuss the issue at
all. This insight, as Bickel frankly acknowledged,"' came from his re-
markable colleague, Professor Charles L. Black, Jr. It is to his contri-
bution to constitutional argument that I shall next turn.
E. Structural Argument
Structural arguments are inferences from the existence of constitu-
tional structures and the relationships that the Constitution ordains
among the structures of government. They are, therefore, different in
kind from historical and textual arguments, which construe a particular
constitutional passage and then insert that construction into the reason-
ing of an opinion. And they are also quite different in kind from pru-
dential arguments, which alter the flow and character of information
going to the judge. Structural arguments are largely factless and de-
106. The true secret of the Court's survival is not, certainly, that in the universe of change
it has been possessed of more permanent truth than other institutions, but rather that its
authority... is in practice limited and ambivalent, and with respect to any given enter-
prise or field of policy, temporary. In this accommodation, the Court endures. But only
in this accommodation. For, by right, the idea of progress is common property.
Id. at 181.
107. Bickel, Reconsideration Edrmund Burke, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 17, 1973, at 31.
108. G. CALABRESI, THE COMMON LAW FUNCTION IN AN AGE OF STATUTES (to be published
by Harv. Univ. Press). For a glimpse of the book's subject, see Calabresi, The Nonprimacy of
Statutes Act: A Comment, 4 VT. L. REv. 247 (1979).
109. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977).
110. A. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 29.
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pend on deceptively simple logical moves from the entire constitutional
text, rather than from one of its parts. At the same time, they embody a
macroscopic prudentialism, that is, not one drawing on the peculiar
facts of the case, but rather one arising from those general assertions
about power and human nature we call common sense. Let me give
you a current example of structural argument.
In National League of Cities v. Usery"' the Supreme Court struck
down a congressional amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act" 2
that would have brought state employees within certain wage and hour
guidelines. The court's reasoning runs roughly as follows: (1) The
Constitution sets up a federal structure, which necessarily includes
states;" 3 (2) unless states perform those functions integral to being a
state without regulation by the national government, the relationship
established by the Constitution between these two structures would be
changed into the assimilation of one structure into the other;' 1" (3) it is
plausible to conclude that, from among various state activities, deter-
mining the wages and hours of its employees is one of those fundamen-
tal state activities. 15
It may be that choosing whether to elect or appoint certain state
officials or where to locate the state capital are other such activities; or
it may not be so. But it necessarily follows from the very structure of
federalism that there must be at least some such activities. I think a
reasonably close reading of National League of Cities will support the
view that it rests on just such a structural argument 1 6 and not, as is
sometimes suggested, 7 on arguments drawn from the text of the tenth
amendment.
T.S. Eliot, in the introduction to an edition of Seneca, wrote that
"[flew things that can happen to a nation are more important than the
invention of a new form of verse.""' 8 This is, as Bronowski character-
ized it, "a startling remark,"" 9 but one I think with some justification.
Far less justification, at any rate, is required for the assertion that few
111. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
112. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), (5), (6), 88
Stat. 55, 58-60 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1970)).
113. 426 U.S. at 844.
114. Id. at 845.
115. Id. at 851.
116. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 423 (1978)
(Burger, C.J., concurring).
117. See, e.g., J. NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
53 (1978); Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaningfor the Tenth Amendmnent?,
1976 Sup. CT. REv. 161.
118. Eliot, Introduction to SENECA: His TENNE TRAGEDIES at xlix-I (T. Newton ed. 1927).
119. J. BRONOWSKI, MAGIC, SCIENCE AND CIVILIZATION 5 (1978).
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things can happen in the life of this Nation that are more important
than the introduction of a new form of constitutional argument. For
such an introduction we are all indebted to Charles Black. This intro-
duction came in Black's Edward Douglass White Lectures in 1968, en-
titled Structure and Relationsho in Constitutional Law.2 '
It was Black's distinction to create anew the structural form at the
very time when doctrinal argument was showing the considerable
strain I have argued it must bear when new law is being written. This
came, of course, at the time of the Warren Court, and it is well to real-
ize that Black was one of the few insistent defenders of that Court's
opinions at the very time when he was, evidently, in search of more
satisfying rationales. For example, it was given to the Warren Court to
devise doctrines by which to protect free speech against state restric-
tion. That Court determined that a solution lay in the first amendment.
This meant that, preliminarily, the Court had to decide-whether his-
torically or textually guided-what content to give to the words "free-
dom of speech" in the first amendment. Then, somehow, it had to
surmount the fact that that amendment refers only to Congress and
that the fourteenth amendment, which does apply to the states, seems
to forbid only those intrusions into our liberty-and restricting our
speech is concededly one-that come about without due process. To
tackle that assignment, the Court alternated between discredited histor-
ical theories about the circumstances of the framing of the amendment
and fantastic doctrines that, although undoubtedly useful, seem to have
no connection whatever to the purposes of the text. Black, by contrast,
offers the following. He argues that because the structure of our fed-
eral government is that of representative democracy, "discussion of all
questions which are in the broadest sense relevant to Congress's work
is, quite strictly, a part of the working of the national government. If it
is not," Black asks, "what is our mechanism for accommodating na-
tional political action to the needs and desires of the people? And if it
is, does it not reasonably follow that a state may not interfere with
it?"121
The principal objection to structural approaches is that they can
offer no firm basis for personal rights. Since structuralists hold that
such rights derive from the relationship between state and citizen, then,
it is argued, the rights of citizens-to say nothing of aliens-are essen-
tially statist and, therefore, vulnerable to the state's desire for power
and its ability to manipulate the relation between citizen and state. It
120. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
121. Id. at 43.
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was Bickel's last book, The Morality of Consent,122 published posthu-
mously, that advanced this objection.
In the notorious DredScottu '23 case, which held that a Negro could
not invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts since he had
not been and could not be a citizen, diverse or otherwise, Bickel saw
the fundamental flaw in a system of rights based on citizenship: what
government may grant, it may take away. 24
Thus, for Bickel, the statement in a then-recent case that
"[c]itizenship is man's basic right for it is nothing less than the right to
have rights" '125 yields the intolerable inferences of Chief Justice Taney,
the author of Dred Scott, that noncitizens "[have] no rights . . . but
such as those who [hold] the power ... might choose to grant
them."'2 6 I am not persuaded by this argument, since I do not believe
government has the power unilaterally to dissolve the bonds of citizen-
ship. Indeed, I think that any structural theory that raises citizenship to
such prominence must hold this axiomatically. But I agree that while
structural approaches are very powerful for some kinds of questions-
particularly intergovernmental issues-they are not, as Bickel sensed,
adequate to the task of protecting human rights. This is why: Though
citizenship may be the proper structure from whose relation to repre-
sentative government we may infer the right to vote on equal terms, 127
to speak on political matters,2 8 to hold office when duly chosen, 129 and
to associate for political purposes, 130 these examples do not capture the
values of personhood that animated both the American Revolution and
constitution-making, and that principally account for the phenomenon
of limited government. Oh, I suppose you have to be your own man to
be truly capable of freely voting your choices in an election, but is that
the reason neither government, nor a collection of individuals acting
while government stands by, ought to be able to deprive you of the
various rights that are the exercise of independent choice? Just what,
after all, does the choice of whom to marry,13 of whether to have chil-
dren, 3 2 or of whether to send your children to private school133 have to
122. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975).
123. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
124. A. BICKEL, supra note 122, at 53.
125. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting)
(emphasis in original), overruled, Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
126. A. BICKEL, srupra note 122, at 53.
127. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
128. E.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
129. E.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
130. E.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
131. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
132. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
133. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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do with the "goodpolitical life"?
Furthermore, isn't there a positive danger in relying on structural
arguments in this area? Since the personal rights to which I have re-
ferred have no affirmative structure in the constitution, won't they al-
ways be sacrificed to those unchecked inferences that plausibly do flow
from the citizen-state relation? For example, might Congress legislate
that each of us be required to listen to political debates or attend politi-
cal discussions, assuming, of course, that these were "unbiased"? Or
might Congress, pursuant to its section five 134 powers to enforce the
rights of citizens, plausibly decide that part of the good political life is
the right to decent housing 35 and require that some number of us with
sufficient space begin lodging those who presently live in slums?
Man is a political animal, it is often said, and we are a political
people. But even a sensitive rendering of what this means in our soci-
ety-that our politics depend on notions of individual autonomy, the
security of one's home and possessions, the primacy of familial and
intimate relations, and the contribution of all these matters to political
attitudes-even this portrait does not capture the fact that constitu-
tional life in America is not just political life. Structural argument then
has, as we have observed of other constitutional approaches, its powers
and its shortcomings. As governments qua producers become more im-
portant in our lives, structural arguments will be more prominent in
our law.
I now think you have some overview of constitutional argument.
You will not be surprised to learn that Crosskey based his views on the
legitimacy of judicial review on a pamphlet, published and distributed
in Philadelphia at the time of the Convention, which outlined a kind of
supreme tribunal somewhat like the current Court, 36 or that Henry
Hart thought that judicial review was to be justified as incident to the
judicial process, 37 or that Charles Black thinks that it is the Court's
structural insulation from elections that permits it to confer legitimacy
upon legislative action.' 38 And you may also have a clearer view of
why some opinions, majority and dissent, seem to pass each other with-
out quite engaging, or why a court can continue a particular line of
134. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
135. See Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REv. 3, 9 (1970).
136. 2 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 13, at 976-1007.
137. See Hart, supra note 31, at 1457. See also H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 62, at
312.
138. See C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 64-66, 86 (1960).
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development despite what appears to be crushing criticism in the law
reviews. Different constitutional arguments reflect different conceptu-
alizations of the Constitution. In the third of these lectures, I will pro-
vide my own view of what foundation does exist for judicial review
outside these various conventions. But before that, there is one more
convention we must consider. That is ethical argument.
II. Constitutional Ethics
The principles of constitutional law are patterns of choice among
kinds of constitutional argument. From each of these patterns one may
derive a particular justification for judicial review. It is, however, an
error virtually endemic to most constitutional commentary to do this in
reverse, choosing first what appears to be a convincing basis for judicial
review and thereafter being persuaded by arguments appropriate to
that particular judicial role. This is a profound error, because it as-
sumes that the commentator comes to the question of judicial review
from a fresh perspective, one outside, as it were, the legal process of
argument. 39
In choosing which justification of judicial review to adopt, we are
following a rule. Indeed, insofar as we are persuaded by the arguments
for a particular justification, we are not really "choosing" anything,
since we cannot choose to be persuaded. By the same token, when,
within the context of a particular constitutional case, we apply a partic-
ular rule, we are also in fact following a rule. In the first lecture, I
asked, "What is that rule, the deeper, predeterminate, rule?" I have
portrayed these rules as various approaches to the construction of the
Constitution. I would emphasize that no sane judge or law professor
can be committed solely to one approach. Because there are many fac-
ets to a single constitutional problem and, as I shall discuss in the third
lecture, many functions performed by a single opinion, the jurist or
commentator uses different approaches as a carpenter uses different
tools, and often many tools, in a single project. What makes the style
of a particular person is the preference for one particular mode over
others. If you were to take a set of colored pencils, assign a separate
color to each of the kinds of arguments I have identified, and mark
through passages in an opinion of the Supreme Court deciding a con-
stitutional matter, you would probably have a multicolored picture
when you fimished. Judges are the artists of our field, just as law
139. See also L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (3d ed. 1958) (a similar
criticism of sense data theories).
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professors are its critics, and we expect the creative judge to employ all
the tools that are appropriate, often in combination, to achieve a satis-
fying result. Furthermore, in a multimembered panel whose members
may prefer different constitutional approaches, the negotiated docu-
ment that wins a majority may, naturally, reflect many hues, rather
than the single bright splash one observes in dissents.
If you ever take up my challenge and try this sport, you will some-
times find that there is nevertheless a patch of uncolored text. And you
may find that this patch contains expressions of considerable passion
and conviction-not simply the idling of the judicial machinery that
one finds in dictum. It is with those patches that I am now concerned.
There is a class of arguments that I will call ethical arguments, which
reflect, like other constitutional arguments, a certain approach to con-
stitutional adjudication, a particular conceptualization of the Constitu-
tion. I will suggest that this class of arguments, like the others I have
discussed, is especially suited to some of the Supreme Court's functions
(and those of other important constitutional deciders) and reflects a
particular commitment to one view of the legitimacy of judicial review.
By "ethical" argument, I mean constitutional argument that relies for
its force on a characterization of American institutions and the role
within them of the American people. It is the character, or ethos, of the
American polity that is advanced in ethical argument as the source
from which a particular decision derives.
There is an almost utter absence of rigorous discussion of these
arguments in the teaching of constitutional law. They are, instead, ei-
ther regarded as disreputable reflections of the moral and political pre-
dispositions of the judge who, owing to a lack of sufficient willpower, is
unable to keep them properly cabined, or, on the other hand, they are
indulged by both the cynical and the sentimental alike as being what
"real" judging is all about. I hope that this lecture will provide a sys-
tematic basis from which to criticize these positions, but for now I am
concerned with their general effect, which has been to justify ignoring
the treatment of ethical approaches as legal, constitutional arguments.
The result of this, with respect to students, I think, has been unfortu-
nate. They know that those constitutional cases that engage them the
most are not decided, for example, on the basis of whether the framers
thought that contraception should be banned,1" or whether the word
"speech" in the first amendment means, among other things, wearing a
140. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 717 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See
also Rehnquist, The Notion of a Iving Constitution, 54 TEXAs L. REv. 693 (1976).
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jacket with a four-letter word on it.' 4' They know this, and so for them
constitutional law may take on an unreal aspect, or at the hands of
some professors, simply dissolve into political science, a sphere from
which civilized law, I believe, has long fled. And so I think that the
mere recognition of ethical arguments, as arguments, may have some
salutary effect. To that task of observation-though, of course, no ob-
servation of this kind is not theory-laden-I now turn.
First let us begin with some recent examples of ethical argument.
In Moore v. City ofEast Cleveland 42 the Supreme Court confronted an
Ohio zoning ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to
members of a single family. Inez Moore, who was 63 years of age,
lived in her own home with her son and two grandsons, one of whom
was her son's son and the other his nephew. For this crime she was
convicted, having failed to remove the nephew as an "illegal occupant"
as defined by the Ohio zoning ordinance.
Precedent, in the form of previous cases sympathetic to the integ-
rity of the family, had focused on the childbearing and childrearing
functions of the nuclear family.' 43 At the same time, the recent case of
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas14 had upheld a zoning ordinance limit-
ing land use by excluding groups of students or friends living together,
and also by excluding groups of married persons who, like the Moores,
were not couples. Nevertheless, a plurality struck down the Ohio stat-
ute. Justice Powell read the earlier decisions, as you will see, not in
terms of their doctrinal consistency-that is, the arguments and ratio-
nales they shared, the intersection of their constitutional arguments-
but in terms of the ethical approach to constitutional questions that
they embodied. Thus, he wrote: "Our decisions establish that the Con-
stitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institu-
tion of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."'' 45 Justice Powell squarely placed the decision on an ethical
ground, that is, one based on the American ethos-by no means shared
by all cultures-that values and uses the extended family for a variety
of reasons: "Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the
bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of un-
cles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household
along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and
141. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
142. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
143. Id. at 536-37 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
144. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
145. 431 U.S. at 503 (footnote omitted).
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equally deserving of constitutional recognition."' 146
This is a clear exposition of an ethical argument. My characteriza-
tion not only enables us to deal with precedent in a way quite distinct
from that taken by the dissenters, but it also establishes itself as a dif-
ferent precedent when understood in this light. Indeed, one value of a
classificatory approach may be appreciated when contrasting it with
more conventional analyses. Professor Tribe, for example, in his ilu-
minating and important treatise, is forced to resort to doctrinal pyro-
technics to rationalize Moore with Belle Terre. The latter case, he
argues, involved students who did not claim "an enduring relationship"
with one another. 47 Therefore, Moore should stand for the prop-
osition, Professor Tribe tells us, that "governmental interference with
any [enduring] relationship should be invalidated unless compellingly
justified"; 4 ' Belle Terre cannot be said, we are told, to foreclose this
position. 149
I fear that counsel who rely on this view are apt to be disillusioned.
There is nothing I can clearly discern in the American ethos that relies
on the value of enduring relationships generally, except possibly maga-
zine subscriptions and appeals from one's old college. It is because
Professor Tribe has elected a different constitutional approach than
that taken by the Court that so able a reader as he is led to so profound
a misconstruction.
Some of you may be tempted to assume that ethical arguments are
simply substantive due process in another form. This is not so. But it is
almost so in an interesting way. At least as applied to the states, ethical
constitutional arguments often seem to involve substantive due process
because the due process clause is the textual vehicle by which the ethos
of limited government has been applied to the states. But the same
thing may be said of the Bill of Rights. No matter how explicit its
provisions may be, the Bill of Rights applies by its terms only to na-
tional government. You should not then dismiss the class of ethical
arguments against the states unless you are also willing to dismiss the
doctrinal arguments that, to take one instance, constitute the entire
main body of first and fifth amendment constitutional law. Further-
more, there is no absolute relation between ethical argument and sub-
stantive due process. Ethical arguments are derived from the
constitutional ethos of limited government. What government is not
146. Id. at 504 (footnote omitted).
147. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTI IrOrNAL LAW § 15-21, at 990 n.30 (1978).
148. Id. at 990 (emphasis in original).
149. Id. at 990 n.30.
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granted the power to do, it may not do. This notion long antedates the
fourteenth amendment.
And so we may see one very famous example of ethical argument
at work in the Pentagon Papers15 ° case, scarcely a candidate for sub-
stantive due process. In that case, no underlying congressional legisla-
tion had authorized the President to prevent publication by the New
York Times of various secret reports on the Vietnam War. Indeed, as
Justice Marshall pointed out, "[o]n at least two occasions Congress
[had] refused to enact legislation that would have ... given the Presi-
dent the power that he [sought] in [that] case."'' And yet the Court
applied conventional prior restraint analysis drawn from applications
of the first amendment, despite the clear terms of that amendment that
it limits Congress' power. The Court simply assumed that what the
President was not empowered to do, he was forbidden to do.
We can observe, if we look carefully, the evidence of ethical ap-
proaches at work in the oral arguments before the Supreme Court,
which the Justices do not have to rephrase in doctrinal terms before
they are published. For example, in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez 15 2
the Supreme Court was asked to strike down a statute that stripped
American citizens of their citizenship for various reasons, including, as
was the case with Mendoza-Martinez, fleeing the country to avoid the
draft. The relevant ethical constitutional approach is an expression of
our constitutional ethos of a government limited in its powers to those
granted by the People. And so, early in oral argument, we hear Justice
Stewart asking for the basis of the government's power over citizen-
ship 5 3 and Justice Brennan answering the government's reply by ob-
serving that "[niothing in the Constitution says Congress can take
citizenship away."' 54 A few minutes later, Justice Black makes the
same observation, adding that the federal government possesses only
those powers expressly granted by the Constitution or necessary to the
exercise of those powers. 55 The attorney for the government parried
these remarks, as he did in his brief, by asserting that a "government
which cannot exert force to compel a citizen to perform his lawful duty
is, to that extent, not sovereign as to him."' 5 6 But that is precisely the
ethical point. That approach is bottomed on the notion that, to some
150. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
151. Id. at 746 (Marshall, J., concurring).
152. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
153. 31 U.S.L.W. 3191 (1962).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 3193.
156. 372 U.S. at 197 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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extent in every matter, and wholly in some matters, government is just
not "sovereign" as to its people.
The same point is evident in the transcript of the oral argument in
Reid v. Covert, 57 a case involving the jurisdiction of a military tribunal
over civilian dependents overseas. The Solicitor General, Mr. Rankin,
had argued 58 that this jurisdiction derived from the extension of con-
stitutional power by the necessary and proper clause. 159 After a sharp
exchange with Justice Black, Rankin finally conceded that it was one
purpose of the Constitution to limit the influence and authority of the
Army, "but," he said, "[the framers] did not want to leave the country
without any defenses."' 60 Save for the ethical argument this lame reply
might have passed unnoticed. Instead, it was the occasion for Justice
Black's tart rejoinder as to the framers' plans: "They did not want to
leave civilians without any defense against the Army."16
It is not the mere existence of ethical argument, however, that I am
asserting. It is its rightness in some situations. And so I would like you
to consider three famous cases, none of whose opinions purports to
reach decision via an ethical approach. See which approach you think
best.
In Trop v. Dulles'62 a former private during the Second World
War challenged the forfeiture of citizenship that had accompanied his
conviction and dishonorable discharge for wartime desertion. This for-
feiture was overturned by the Supreme Court on the ground that it
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment.163 It was a splintered decision, five to four on the result,
with no opinion claiming a majority. Yet there are few people, I sus-
pect, who think that military tribunals ought to be able to denationalize
someone. The difficulty is with the eighth amendment rationale. It is
simply hard to swallow the argument that a collateral penalty for what
is, after all, a constitutionally validated capital offense,164 is unconstitu-
tionally harsh. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it: "Can [it] be seriously
urged that loss of citizenship is a fate worse than death?"' 1 65 Certainly
the collateral penalty was not unusual in the sense of being novel or
bizarre; the statute struck down was the lineal descendent of one first
157. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
158. 25 U.S.L.W. 3252 (1957).
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
160. 25 U.S.L.W. at 3253.
161. Id.
162. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
163. Id. at 101-03.
164. 10 U.S.C. § 885 (1976).
165. 356 U.S. at 125 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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adopted in 1865.166 The justification for our intuitive sense of the
rightness of the holding in Trop v. Dulles must lie elsewhere.
I would have thought that a governmental agency could not uni-
laterally dissolve the bonds of citizenship of a natural-born citizen be-
cause the government was not responsible for joining them in the first
place. Since this relationship between citizen and state has constitu-
tional status, 167 and since so much of our political life is predicated
upon it, I would assume that it is a principle of the American constitu-
tional ethic that representative government, created by the People act-
ing as a whole, may not begin slicing off groups of those People
without the consent of the People once more. Now this ethical argu-
ment leads to some close questions. I think these questions are also
best approached not by asking whether they may be analogized to
drawing and quartering, but from the perspective of the constitutional
ethic.
In Rochin v. California,68 for another example, a narcotics convic-
tion was challenged by a defendant who, upon the arrival of police
officers in his home, swallowed two capsules that the police sought to
extract from him, first by physical force and later, at a hospital, by
forcing him to take an emetic. He vomited the capsules which, found
to contain morphine, were admitted in evidence against him at trial.
Urging an approach that has since been adopted by the Court, Justice
Black wrote in concurrence that the government's part in these events
contravened the fifth amendment because the vomiting of the capsules
amounted to self-incrimination without consent. 169 Applying this
standard twelve years later, the Court held that blood tests may be
taken without consent from a conscious person after an auto acci-
dent.' 70 The results of a blood test, you see, were not evidence of a
"testimonial" nature, the Court said, and hence not within the fifth
amendment. '71
All of us must feel that there is something strange in these analy-
ses. Could Rochin have been forced to vomit if he had been granted
prior immunity? Or if the evidence were sought for use against his wife
(who in fact was present in the room at the time of the search and
166. See Roche, The Loss of American Nationality-The Development of Statutory Expatria-
lion, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 60-61 (1950).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 258-63 (1980);
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
168. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
169. 342 U.S. at 174-75 (Black, J., concurring).
170. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
171. Id. at 765.
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therefore potentially a defendant) and not against him? Perhaps we
may disagree as to whether the forcible administration of blood or
breath tests is permissible, but is the real issue whether the evidence
produced is "testimonial" in nature? Is it not, instead, whether a con-
stitutional ethic applies here, one that finds partial expression in some
of the passages of the Bill of Rights and that restrains the police from
physically degrading an individual in custody in an effort to enforce
law?
Or consider the notorious Skinner 172 case. An Oklahoma statute
that provided for the sterilization of habitual criminals was applied
against a man three times convicted of theft and robbery, the first time
for stealing chickens. Purporting-and I say this with all humility and
respect-to rest its decision on the ground that similar offenses-em-
bezzlement, for example-were exempted from triggering the punish-
ment, the Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma statute violated the
equal protection clause.173 The statute, Justice Douglas wrote for the
Court, created an invidious discrimination against a certain class of of-
fenders. 174 Despite this doctrinal rationale by one of the Court's most
gifted jurists, I simply cannot believe that if the measure had been ex-
tended to defendants convicted of larceny by trick, and so forth, that
the statute would have, or should have, survived constitutional scru-
tiny. That is because I do not think American government may impose
a system of eugenics, no matter how egalitarian and, to reject Chief
Justice Stone's approach, 175 no matter how formal the hearing that pre-
cedes its implementation. I do not think American government can do
this because among the means fairly inferred from the affirmative pow-
ers accorded the federal government-the limits of which means apply
to state means--eugenic improvement is simply not present. Of course
it is not forbidden, but then the framers may have thought better of us
than to anticipate that it need be.
I do not disagree with the results arrived at in any of these deci-
sions. My complaint, therefore, is not that the Court in a few odd and
famous cases is wrongly deciding, but rather that it is wrongly explain-
ing. Since in law, as in science, explanation is prediction, my complaint
is hardly an idle one. If you should come to believe that ethical argu-
ments in these cases would have produced more candid opinions,176 or
172. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
173. Id. at 538.
174. Id. at 541.
175. Id. at 543-45 (Stone, C.J., concurring).
176. See generaly G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 26, 74-75 (1978).
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if you find ethical approaches in these cases more satisfying than the
attenuated textual and doctrinal methods that the Court actually chose,
then a case has been made for the use of ethical argument. But it is
more than this. If you fred this approach more satisfying, then I sug-
gest that such arguments may be what actually motivates the decision
process. If I am right in this, and it can be shown, then perhaps it can
be established that ethical arguments in constitutional law operate in
the same way that other types of constitutional argument operate.
Ignoring ethical approaches has yielded the cynical conclusion
that mere political bias rather than argument governs much constitu-
tional decision. Even the most gullible student is reluctant to accept the
doctrinal justification in, say, Shapiro v. Thompson'7 7 that welfare resi-
dency requirements are unconstitutional because they interfere with the
equal protection to be afforded travel.I" Ignoring the existence of ethi-
cal arguments qua arguments has had other costs as well. Not only
candor, but simplicity is sacrificed. Most importantly, the exile of ethi-
cal argument from the domain of legitimate constitutional discussion
has denied an important resource to the creative judge who exploits all
the various approaches from time to time and case to case.
Ethical argument has been neglected because it is feared. We are
unwilling to use constitutional institutions as a moral arbiter, and
therefore many would like to remove moral argument from constitu-
tional law altogether. Why are we unwilling to view ethical argument
as appropriate to constitutional decisionmaking? Obviously, there
have been many societies-indeed, we have seen the emergence of one
such in Iran-that wholly integrate ethical and constitutional functions.
There are two reasons that support this attitiude; one is widely accepted
in various forms, and the other is correct.
The first view is roughly analogous to the empiricist's hostility to
moral observations generally. One reason we are disinclined to admit
moral statements into a calculus of truths about the world, as opposed
to our willingness to admit scientific hypotheses, is that the latter are
verifiable by observation evidence. If I observe a vapor trail in an elec-
tron chamber, I am inclined to count this as evidence of an electron. If,
on the other hand, I feel moral indignation at the government's deci-
sion to suspend food stamps, this scarcely establishes the wrongness of
the government's act; it only counts as evidence of my feelings. 179
Conventional constitutional arguments appear to have the same
177. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
178. See id. at 638.
179. See generally G. HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALrrY (1977).
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epistemological basis as statements of scientific observation. That is,
there are independent phenomena-the text, historical events, political
structure, the calculus of costs and benefits, or previous case law-that
stand for a state of affairs independent of our feelings. True, you and I
may put different interpretations on a piece of historical evidence, but
this is no different than trying on different scientific hypotheses for fit.
There is an objective fact. But when I say that a statute is unconstitu-
tional because it violates an ethic to which our government ought to
cleave, am I not simply saying something about my perception, a con-
clusion perhaps, but not anything about the Constitution per se?
This view of things is, I think, quite probably wrong about science
and the role of observation evidence, 80 but I am certain it is wrong
about the process of constitutional law. In both cases it treats an ob-
ject-the constitutional rule or the electron-as severable from our ap-
prehension of it and use of it with other concepts. This is an error with
respect to the Constitution since the choice of a particular mode of ap-
proach and argument is itself not the product of an objective fact.
Nothing in the Constitution dictates, for example, the use of historical
argument, but even if this were not so, our application of such a provi-
sion would be made in light of how we apply textual provisions gener-
ally.
The second objection to ethical argument is more telling. It admits
that we see our Constitution through various legal conventions-that
the Constitution is inseparable from the organizing framework of these
conventions. These are the arguments I discussed in the first lecture,
and the Constitution ve are to apply will appear differently depending
on which convention is chosen. But competing moral conventions gen-
erally do not, among themselves, provide the methods for resolution
that are available within the various competing legal approaches.
Since ours is a society of considerable moral pluralism, to admit ethical
arguments in the constitutional arena is to sacrifice the ameliorative,
assimilating power of constitutional law.'' The result would be, one
fears, the kind of intractable ideological conflict so notable on the Eu-
ropean scene. The conventions of a legal language are then exchanged
for ideologies, in the face of which no event, much less an argument
grounded in a different approach, can but confirm to each side the
180. See Kuhn, Logic of Discovery of Psychology or Research, in CRITICISM AND THE
GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 1 (I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave eds. 1970).
181. To take advantage of this power, as de Tocqueville observed, political questions in
America are often transmuted into legal questions. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 248 (J. Mayer & M. Lerner eds. 1966).
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rightness of its principles. It is difficult, for example, to argue with a
Marxist about the shortcomings of the labor theory of value, since he is
likely to insist that one's objections are merely part of the prevailing
bourgeois ideology.1 82 It is like arguing with a Freudian about psycho-
analytic theory when the Freudian contends that your objections are
really "resistances." '83
This is a substantial and highly important shortcoming of ethical
argument in constitutional law. When the authoritative decider is the
Supreme Court, this shortcoming is greatly worsened, since the finality
of a constitutional decision by that Court often freezes the situation,
preventing action by other constitutional institutions. Indeed, given
the federal structure of law in our society, a good argument might be
made that moral arguments generally should be ruthlessly excluded
from the constitutional discourse altogether.
I believe that this argument, for example, accounts for the phe-
nomenon of federal habeas corpus, which is otherwise difficult to jus-
tify. This process severs the constitutional decision from the moral
question of guilt or innocence so that the former can be weighed dis-
passionately, as one suspects it seldom can in the context of trial. At
the same time, federal habeas corpus gives the matter to a group of
deciders whose customary business is, by comparison with state courts,
largely amoral. It is the state courts that must confront questions of
moral blame, broken promises, negligent or intentional harm, marital
collapse, and almost all crime, while federal courts, save for their diver-
sity jurisdiction, are largely given over to matters of government regu-
lation, intergovernmental conflict, and national commerce. Federal
habeas corpus enables the constitutional questions to be given the pri-
ority they can never achieve when held in the balance with a moral
conviction widely enough shared to have found its way into a state's
criminal code.
But doesn't such a distinction between moral argument and moral
deciders on the one hand, and constitutional argument and federal
judges on the other, actually reflect an accommodation with the source
of the principal shortcoming of ethical argument, that is, its independ-
ent, nonlegal ground? Aren't the values of the fourth and fifth amend-
ments, which habeas corpus has protected to the extent of turning so
many guilty men free, aren't these values also "ethical"? If so, then it
may be that we can identify a class of ethical arguments that originate
182. See Robinson, The Chomsky Problem, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1979, § 7 (Book Review), at
3.
183. See id.
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in a specifically constitutional ethos, and hence avoid the difficulties of
ethical and moral arguments generally.
Arguments are most clearly and easily derived from the constitu-
tional ethos when that ethos may be identified from some specific text
in back of which, so to speak, it may be said to stand. Thus, it has been
argued that it would be unconstitutional for government to require a
landlord to rent to a specific party-as by a statutory extension of open
housing laws-since to do so would be to exercise a power analogous to
that proscribed by the third amendment's provision against the quarter-
ing of soldiers in private dwellings.' 84 First of all, notice that this is an
ethical, not a textual argument, despite the fact that it depends for its
force on an analogy to the text. The argument is ethical because it
assumes a constitutional ethos, textually manifested in one instance by
the words of the third amendment. The classic textual argument ap-
plied to the open housing case, on the other hand, would be that since
the language of the amendment is specifically limited to military occu-
pation, any constitutional application to civilian occupiers is insupport-
able.
If we could neatly limit constitutional ethical arguments to those
that have textual cousins, so to speak, relatives whose characteristics
identify for us the common ancestor,'85 then we would be able to
clearly distingfiish such arguments from moral arguments generally.
For example: Assume we confront the practice of a state mental hospi-
tal to drug some of its patients into a perpetual senility. One way to
resolve the constitutional problem posed by this practice would be to
characterize such treatment as "punishment" and find that it offends
the eighth amendment." 6 This is strained, since we do not think of
committing people for therapy as punishment for crimes. Indeed, just
the opposite is true.8 7 Yet the eighth amendment might nevertheless
be of help here. Suppose we think that the textual provision of the
amendment, that forbids cruel and unusual punishment is evidence of a
more general constitutional ethos, one principle of which is that gov-
ernment must not degrade the persons for whose benefit it is consti-
tuted. If we have this, or something like it, we may then make the
ethical argument against this treatment, if such it is, per se. We would
be able to take advantage of the resolving power of legal conventions-
184. See Black, supra note 135, at 38-39.
185. See id. at 37-40 (additional examples of analogical reasoning).
186. See Comment, Eugenic Sterilization Statutes: 4 Constitutional Re-evaluation, 14 J. FAm.
L. 280, 289-90 (1975).
187. See id. at 290.
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the teaching of which I have come to believe is the principal duty of
law schools-while shunning the pretense that only nonethical argu-
ments are truly constitutional, are truly "legal."
But this nice position is not really available to us. In the first
place, there is one specific text-the words of the ninth amend-
ment l s that makes it quite clear that the Bill of Rights and the body
of the Constitution do not exhaustively enumerate the rights of persons.
And there is simply nothing to suggest that only the enumerated rights
can lead us to the unenumerated ones. Moreover, and more important,
given the limited nature of the government that the body of the Consti-
tution describes, the retained rights of persons--even if there were no
ninth amendment-would necessarily constitute an infinite list. Both
the unspecified rights and the enumerated prohibitions derive from the
general constitutional ground of enumerated and implied powers and
not from each other. Our rights are defined by the shoreline of the
enumerated powers. Where delegated government authority stops, our
rights begin.
You will recall the initial opposition of James Madison and others
to the adoption of a bill of rights.' 89 It was said then that such specific
protections were unnecessary since the power to achieve the objects
that the various amendments would prohibit had not been delegated to
the federal government in the first place. 9 ' As Hamilton wrote prior to
the adoption of the Constitution: "Why, for instance, should it be said
that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is
given by which restrictions may be imposed?"' 9 ' The Bill of Rights,
therefore, is in this view an incomplete list of those objects that are
denied the government because government is not given the power to
accomplish them. The body of the original, unamended Constitution,
in the words of Federalist Number 84, "is itself, in every rational sense,
and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS."'19 2
188. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
189. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 8, at 587-88. See 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 435-623 (1971).
190. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 8, at 617-18.
191. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton) 156 (Tudor ed. 1937).
192. Id. at 157. The Court recently relied precisely on this argument to reach a result that is
an instructive example of the power of the ethical approach. To understand this requires a brief
digression.
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), a divided Court held that the sixth
amendment's guarantee of a public trial in criminal cases does not afford the press or the public
an enforceable right of access to pretrial suppression hearings. The Court purported to reserve the
question of whether the first and fourteenth amendments guarantee a right of the public to attend
pretrial hearings or trial itself. Id. at 392 (plurality opinion). The decision provoked a vigorous
dissent by Justice Blackmun, who argued that the sixth amendment does not permit a private trial
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So one way we may understand the Bill of Rights is as a collection
of those examples of power denied the federal government that simply
happened to occur to Madison and others as requiring reinforcement,
on account, perhaps, of past treatment at the hands of unlimited gov-
ernment. To understand this is to understand, by way of our constitu-
tional grammar, the notion of substantive due process. However much
these doctrines may be despised,' 93 they are a necessary occurrence,
given the necessarily partial list of rights that is the Bill of Rights. Re-
gardless of how many politicians or professors rail against these doc-
trines, they cannot be avoided without doing violence to the
constitutional ethos that every lawyer and judge has internalized. Sub-
stantive due process is not a function of politically aggressive judges
who have lost their heads, acting as would-be legislators, abandoning
any sense of self-restraint. Rather the doctrine is the necessary product
of the superimposition onto a state system of plenary authority of a
federal court system dedicated to preserving those individual liberties
that animated the Constitution. As such, substantive due process is the
even if the accused waives his right to a public trial with the consent of the prosecutor and the
court. Note the similarity of this position to the ethical approach examined here: the Bill of
Rights is a partial list of those powers denied the government. The sixth amendment merely
emphasizes that the government is granted no power to close trials to the public, and the defend-
ant's waiver of his sixth amendment right cannot confer power on the government that the Consti-
tution did not expressly or impliedly establish.
Not surprisingly, the Gannett decision was the source of much confusion and apprehension.
The immediate question left unanswered was whether the Constitution provided any barrier to the
closing of a trial with the defendant's consent. The Court recently answered that question in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980). Chief Justice Burger, writing for
the Court, concluded that the first and fourteenth amendments provided a qualified right in the
public and the press of access to trials, despite the concurring decision of the defendant, the prose-
cutor, and the trial court to close the trial.
Of course, as Chief Justice Burger recognized, "the Constitution nowhere spells out a guaran-
tee for the right of the public to attend trials." Id. at 2828. However, relying on the Constitutional
Convention's response to Madison's fears that the enumeration of certain rights might be read to
exclude others, 1d. at 2829 & n. 15, the Chief concluded that "[t]he concerns expressed by Madison
and others have . . . been resolved; fundamental rights, even though not expressly guaranteed,
have been recognized by the Court as indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined,"
id. at 2829. "The Constitution guarantees more than simply freedom from those abuses which led
the Framers to single out particular rights." Id. at 2828 n.14.
This remarkable decision surely reveals the workings of an ethical approach. Although the
Constitution does not in express terms limit the power of government to close trials when the
defendant does not object, the Justices obviously believed that the assertion of that power was
inconsistent with the scheme of limited powers established by the Constitution. Although, as Jus-
tice Blackmun reminded his brethren, id. at 2842, the Court had previously rejected the sixth
amendment as the textual recognition of this limit and thus deprived itself of a more plausible
textual support for its decision, something like an ethical approach led the Court to announce that
such limits did exist, notwithstanding the absence of express language. If the decision is remarka-
ble, it is because the ethical approach appeared so near the surface of the written opinions.
193. See, e.g., L. LUSKY, By WHAT RIGHT? 336-41 (1975); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 937-49 (1973); Vieira, Roe andDoe: Substantive Due
Process and the Right of Abortion, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 870-79 (1974).
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inevitable by-product of the constitutional events of the 1860s and
1870s, events that are reflected in, but not captured by, the customary
meaning of the few phrases in the first sentence of the first part of the
fourteenth amendment. 194
Therefore, it is perfectly natural that we should see the greatest use
of ethical argument in cases nowadays thought of as involving substan-
tive due process. The greatest use, and the greatest difficulty-since
treating such an approach with an irrelevant textual talisman such as
"due process" and all the redundant doctrine of "fundamental rights"
is hardly a promising beginning-is developing the distinction between
constitutional ethical arguments and moral arguments generally. This
distinction must be maintained if we are not to slip into competing
moral conventions, all the more dangerous when they are widely
shared.
Ethical argument can be made into constitutional argument by re-
quiring that a specifically constitutional ethos-and not a moral one-
be its source. Such an ethos may be indicated by a specific provision in
the Bill of Rights-as the fifth amendment points to a larger principle
that government may not force defendants to assist in their own de-
struction in a criminal trial, or as the fourth amendment points to a
larger principle that some sorts of privacy may be infringed by govern-
ment only on a showing of necessity--or it may be the more general
American constitutional ethos of limited government. If it is the latter,
we may say that, against the federal government, those means not fairly
implied from the enumerated powers are denied it. And those means
denied the federal government are also limitations on the states, by vir-
tue of the integration of federal constitutional norms into the contours
of state authority produced by the Civil War. That is to say that states,
in the pursuit of their quite different ends, are denied those means that
are not necessary and proper to the achievement of federal ends. We
can say this was accomplished by the Civil War amendments, but this
is deeply misleading since they are, like the Bill of Rights, mere reflec-
tions of the change that generated them. Like most Southerners, I am
acutely aware that the Civil War, or the War Between the States as we
were taught to call it, was a constitutional war. The questions of consti-
tutional authority and human rights then, as now, were really one ques-
194. The Civil War amendments, U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, effectuated a revolu-
tion in the constitutional arrangement by deploying the federal courts to enforce limitations on
state power with respect to state citizens and persons in the states. Substantive due process was the
result of applying the federal notion in a state context that a limited grant of power, by its very
limitation, implied a personal right. That is to say, the federal courts chose to overlay on the
realm of state power the federal model of limitations defined by affirmative grants.
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tion. I do not believe, for example, that black disenfranchisement
could constitutionally continue after the War, regardless of the adop-
tion of the fifteenth amendment. 195
Furthermore, there is a provision appended to the Civil War
amendments, as the ninth amendment is appended to the Bill of Rights,
to remind us that the list of prohibitions against involuntary servitude,
the denial of equal protection, and so forth, is not exhaustive. I am
referring to the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 196 When that clause is construed in light of the ethical
approaches I have sketched in these preceding pages, its role in this
way will be clear. It has been thought that there were two principal
difficulties with using the privileges and immunities clause as the vehi-
cle by which human rights could be enforced against the states. I leave
aside the doctrinal roadblocks that derive from precedent, since these
are merely reflections of the Supreme Court's appreciation of these dif-
ficulties. First, it is said that we are unsure of just what the "privileges
and immunities" referred to actually comprise.197 What catalogues of
these rights we have been offered sound like lists of rights the speaker
considers important, and nothing more. In this they resemble the "fun-
damental rights" of contemporary due process analysis, and therefore
to rely on them is scarcely to improve the situation. Second, it has been
thought that the protection the clause offers would shield citizens
only.198 In this respect, the due process clause,199 which speaks of "per-
sons," would seem more favorable.
Thus it is that we have been tempted to ignore the plain meaning
of the due process clause-that life, liberty, and property can be taken
so long as it is done with procedural correctness-and, responding to
the theoretical demands arising from the Civil War's rearrangement of
constitutional limits on state authority, to contrive the doctrines of sub-
stantive due process. The following alternative will better serve these
demands.
One view, an ethical view, of federal constitutional human rights
describes them as being beyond the boundary limned by enumerated
195. At oral argument in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1963), counsel for
the State of Virginia argued to the contrary, 34 U.S.L.W. 3261, 3262 (1966).
196. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States. ... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
197. Benoit, The Privileges or Immunities Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment: Can There Be
Lfe After Death?, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 61, 100 (1976).
198. See id. at 109; Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at
Last", 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405, 415, 419; 42 COLUM. L. REv. 139, 141 (1942).
199. "[No State shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... " U.S. CoNsT. amend. XJV, § 1.
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powers and implied means. The federal government may not employ
any means not necessary and proper, not fairly inferable, from its enu-
merated powers. One might say that this is a sort of immunity vis-4-vis
the federal government: one is immune from such means, or, to put it
another way, one is privileged, with respect to national government, to
be treated only in those ways that are constitutionally mandated. This
fundamental relationship, as the ninth amendment emphasizes, is the
privilege and immunity of citizens of the United States because it is the
very foundation of national authority. (It thus has nothing to do with
the privileges and immunities of state citizens, mentioned in article
IV.2°°)
A few moments ago I said that the application of the ethic of lim-
ited constitutional government to the states yields the rule that states
may not, in pursuit of their unenumerated and plenary ends, employ
those means denied the federal government. Now we can see the tex-
tual basis for this assertion. Furthermore, we now have a generative
rule for determining what are the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States. We need only ask: Is this legislative means
(whether federal or state) one that is fairly inferable from one of the
federal enumerated powers? Moreover, this formulation also enables
us to deal with the citizen/person problem. It shows us that the prob-
lem was a false one. Because we were mesmerized by the model of
rights as trumps, we treated the "privileges and immunities" as rights
that belonged to someone, that is, citizens. But the text does not say
that no state shall deprive "any citizen" of privileges and immunities, a
construction that would be parallel to that of the due process and equal
protection provisions that forbid states to deny to "any person" their
protections. Instead, the text reads: "No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States."20' If we give the meaning I have suggested to the
entire clause-privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States-we have a general limit on state government, 'not a specific
right held by any specified group. States may not abridge the right to
be the subject of only that governmental action that is within the con-
stitutional means of the United States government, regardless of who is
affected by the abridgement.
I am partial to this account of the privileges and immunities
200. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
in the several States." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
201. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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clause. It makes useful what has been, up to now, a barren provision 20 2
and does so within a relatively spare theoretical construction that si-
multaneously explains the historical development of the police power
and substantive due process doctrines as post-Civil War constitutional
limits on state authority. But suppose there were no privileges and im-
munities clause. If it were a mere text we required-and not the mor-
phogenesis the text records-we could make use of the tenth
amendment's equivocal suggestion that some powers not prohibited the
states are nevertheless reserved to the people. That amendment reads:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people. 2 °3 Unless the last phrase is surplusage, there must be
some unspecified, unenumerated rights that belong to the people
against the states. That is, there are some powers which, while not del-
egated to the United States nor explicitly prohibited to the states, are
nevertheless in the hands of the people and not the states.
But if you are really persuaded by this discussion of ethical argu-
ments, you will want to say that an explicit text is superfluous. The real
test of ethical arguments-whether they have force and derive from our
constitutional ethos- is, as with all legal arguments, in the application
to concrete cases. Therefore, I should like to devote the rest of this
lecture to a discussion of a significant case that could have, or perhaps I
really mean should have, been resolved by an ethical approach.
Roe v. Wade2 1 is perhaps the most important, and certainly the
most controversial, constitutional decision of this decade. The decision
in that case, which struck down the Texas abortion law,2 °5 has done
almost as much to shape current attitudes about ourselves and our soci-
ety as have the social and technological changes that did so much to
bring about the decision. And yet one rarely encounters a law profes-
sor or judge willing to defend the decision. The first semester I taught
constitutional law at the University of Texas Law School, my distin-
guished colleague Professor Wright began his discussion of Roe by say-
ing that only my appointment forced him to amend his customary
introduction: that he knew of no one teaching constitutional law on
this faculty who thought the case rightly decided.
202. See Benoit, supra note 197, at 61-98; Kurland, supra note 198, at 406-14.
203. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
204. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
205. 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 33, § 1, at 55 (held unconstitutional); 1858 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch.
121, at 17, 4 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TExAs 1044 (1898) (held unconstitutional). The companion
case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), struck down the Georgia abortion law.
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I think the universal disillusionment with Roe v. Wade20 6 may be
traced to the inadequacies of the opinion, and I will endeavor to pro-
pose a rationale that is more satisfying than the doctrinal approaches
taken by Justice Blackmun. Let us begin by simply recounting those
approaches.
The opinion of the Court may be parsed in the following way.
First, the Court asserts that the constitutional right of privacy has been
established by case law.2 °7 Second, without explication of the develop-
ment of that right in precedent, the opinion asserts that the fundamen-
tal right "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy. '20 8 Third, largely nonprivacy cases are
cited for the proposition that only a compelling state interest will per-
mit the state's regulation of this fundamental right.2" 9 Fourth, with re-
spect to the state's compelling interest in protecting the fetus, the Court
concludes that the compelling point is at viability because "the fetus
then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the
mother's womb. '2 10 Thus, the Court determined that, in the first tri-
mester of pregnancy, the state, having no viable fetal life in which to
take a compelling interest, may not regulate abortion at all; in the sec-
ond trimester, it may not forbid abortion; only in the third trimester,
after quickening, can the state outlaw abortion of the fetus.2 '
Several features of this rationale catch the eye. No reason is given
why the right-to-privacy cases establish a right to that least of all pri-
vate experiences, an abortion. Certainly a technology that allowed a
fully-clothed woman to pass through an X-ray gate and abort would
not mean that the woman's right was less fundamental than that of a
woman using an operating room procedure. The Court does not tell us
what features of the situation in Roe are forcefully analogous to those
in the cases that developed the right to privacy.21 2 But even assuming
that the right to procure an abortion is "fundamental" in the way that
other privacy-derived rights have been held constitutionally significant,
there is no reason to suppose, and none is offered by the opinion, that
206. See, e.g., Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need/or a Lfe-Protecive Amend-
ment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250 (1975); Ely, supra note 193; Epstein, Substantive Due Process byAny
Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159; O'Meara, Abortion: The Court Decides
a Non-Case, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 337; Vieira, supra note 193.
207. 410 U.S. at 152-53.
208. Id. at 153.
209. Id. at 155-56.
210. Id. at 163.
211. Id. at 164-65.
212. Certainly, the privacy of the bedroom and sexual practice, so important in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965), has been left far behind by the time a woman checks
into an abortion clinic.
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the protection of an embryo or fetus is an insufficiently "compelling
interest" to permit the state to infringe such a fundamental right. For
the case law that establishes privacy as a fundamental right also relies
on a compelling state interest analysis to determine the scope of that
right. The latter is a part of the doctrine of fundamental rights. The
decision in Roe, however, turns on a metaphysical assessment that only
when the fetus is viable does the state's interest become compelling.
This assessment of relative worth does not seem inferable from the
Constitution or the record in the case. Indeed, it appears to rest on the
unacknowledged and plainly incorrect premise that only living, self-
sufficient entities may serve as the object of the state's compelling inter-
ests.
2 13
Thus, the two principal propositions on which the opinion rests are
neither derived from precedent nor elaborated from larger policies that
may be thought to underlie such precedent. As such, the opinion is as
close to a total failure as a doctrinal opinion can be. But I doubt that
the members of the Court, any more than you, were actually persuaded
by these arguments. The Court was, as were its critics, mesmerized, I
believe, by one or two conventions of constitutional arguments.
But suppose we try a different approach. Let's begin by asserting a
rule that would decide Roe v. Wade and then testing it in the way I
suggested a few moments ago. I propose this rule: Government may
not coerce intimate acts. Now there may be no cases establishing this
rule, but that scarcely counts against its constitutional status, since leg-
islators may so take it for granted that they simply do not pass laws that
are offensive to that rule. And the text need not confirm this rule ei-
ther, saying, as it does, merely that there are unspecified prohibitions.
So the next step is to try our constitutional sense of the matter by test-
ing the rule in various situations that might implicate it.
For example, it would seem clear enough that a teacher in the pub-
lic schools may not order students to perform sex acts as part of a sex
education class. Does anyone think that a state might be able to order
marriages as a remedy in paternity suits? Or, from another angle, order
conception between individuals thought to have desirable characteris-
tics, or among groups-say state workers-thought to be reproducing
too little? Does anyone even entertain the possibility that the state
might be able to order errant husbands or wives to rejoin the families
they have abandoned? Certainly the state may order parents to pay
213. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (finding a compelling state interest in
the prevention of the wanton destruction of draft cards); Ely, supra note 193, at 924-26.
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support; why not order them back into the home, there to provide a
fuller kind of support?
If no one thinks for a moment that states could order any of these
practices, why does no one think so? It seems to me that the barriers
are constitutional, and while I confidently expect them to be enforced
by legislatures, I cannot imagine that this empirical fact implies that a
federal court may not enforce such barriers.
I restate then my principle: Government may not coerce intimate
acts. And I argue that whatever else may be an intimate act, the act of
carrying a child within one's body and giving birth must be a pro-
foundly intimate act. I can think of no other relation as intimate as
that which exists between woman and developing embryo, a relation so
intermingling that all other acts that seem intimate to us are, by con-
trast, momentary and detached. If the state could not coerce its females
into conceiving in its behalf, how can it be claimed that it can coerce
them into carrying an embryonic form until the woman is forced to
give it birth?
Yet perhaps government is not, in every case, delimited from co-
ercing a woman to carry a child to term, because in many cases the
woman has waived her right to object to coercion. To take polar exam-
ples, I assume that few would argue that a woman, nine months after a
voluntary and knowing conception, can at that point assert a claim to
be free from carrying a child; on the other hand, one could hardly de-
mand that the victim of a forcible rape be denied an abortion requested
the following day on the ground that she has consented to a waiver of
her rights. We may disagree as to what time period is, in what circum-
stances, appropriate to a conclusion that waiver has occurred, but in
resolving this question we have familiar legal concepts to serve as
guides. It is not unreasonable to suggest that a woman who voluntarily
consents not merely to sexual intercourse-since it is relatively unlikely
that this will lead to pregnancy and that the woman can therefore be
said to have knowingly consented to giving birth-but also to carrying
a child for a period long enough so that she can be presumed both to be
aware of her condition and to have had the time to reflect on it, has by
her acquiescence waived any claim against the state's coercion. More-
over, this perspective justifies the intuitive notion given expression by
state legislatures that a woman who is raped or is the object of incest is
different from one who consents to sexual relations, despite the fact
that the fetus in both situations is in the same condition.
This basis for determining under what circumstances government
may intervene might be given effect in statutes that reflected a conclu-
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sive presumption of waiver after some period and in particular circum-
stances. Or such a statute might provide instead for some initial
showing by the state, as part of the enforcement of the statute, that the
woman had, by her acts, waived her right. Unlike the doctrinal ratio-
nale in Roe, which permits no state regulation during the first trimes-
ter, this rationale would allow states to prescribe sterile surroundings
and competent physicians and therapists as long as these rules did not
coerce the woman into carrying to term.
It will be observed that the rationale I have offered yields the same
outcome-the trimester rule-as that achieved by the Court (with the
wholesome modification that not all regulation need be forbidden in
the first trimester). I am inclined to believe that this similarity reflects
the actual pull of unacknowledged ethical argument on the members of
the Roe majority. Or it may be that I am simply writing in the tradi-
tion of law professors who employ a certain facility to rationalize what
the Court in fact does. If the same result is achieved, does it really
matter by what route?
To ask this, as to ask whether there are overriding government
interests that will justify striking a balance, in extreme cases, in favor of
coercion, is to ignore the entire approach of the preceding pages. In
actuality, government is wholly limited from coercing a woman to
carry a child and give birth. Because the mode of the Roe argument I
have given is ethical, as I have used the term, it cannot yield the Court's
result. Ethical arguments arise from the ethos of limited government
and the seam where powers end and rights begin. As such, no "waiver"
on the part of the woman can augment the government's authority. In-
deed, she has the right because government has no power to begin with.
The ethical argument I have proposed in Roe v. Wade differs from
a similar one that you may recognize in my scheme of things as a moral
argument simpliciter, and, therefore, one whose study may illuminate
the present approach. That argument is that a state may not require a
person to risk her life for the purpose of benefiting another. The com-
mon law rule has long been that one has no duty to intervene in behalf
of one stricken or in peril.21 4 Although some courts have recognized a
duty to render aid under special circumstances, such a duty scarcely
goes so far as to require significant risk.215 A variant of this argument
has been put forth by Judith Jarvis Thomson, with her customary elo-
214. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRm § 56, at 338-43 (4th ed. 1971).
215. See id. at 341-53.
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quence, in Philosophy andPublic Affairs. I6 But this argument is in fact
not part of our constitutional ethos, as reflected in the common law.
For this approach seems to treat the embryonic child as a stranger who
merely happens to be inconveniently placed proximate to the mother.
There is much law, however, for the proposition that one owes a duty
of care to one's child. And to avoid this puts us back in the position of
deciding when child life begins, a position that the Roe Court was doc-
trinally forced to take in its argument, despite its disclaimers, and one
that sound constitutional decision ought to avoid completely.
As far as my own rationale for Roe v. Wade is concerned, it must
be painfully apparent that constitutional, ethical decision--decision
proceeding from a constitutional ethos-can not only be distinguished
from moral argument but that it can lead, as many will feel it does
here, to a clearly immoral end. It may be that a similar consequence
occurs when the constitutional ethos of unrestrained communication
prohibits the eradication of pornography.
The complementary feature of ethical argument, applied in the
way I have advocated, is that while it may confine government in few
respects, it is an absolute bar as to the rights it does protect. This view
may be derided for its impracticality. But I ask the reader, is it less
practical to say government may not force a woman to carry to term,
under any circumstances, or to say that fact determinations about the
viability of the fetus (which will vary with technology and circum-
stances), legal holdings as to the scope or intensity of government's in-
terests, and philosophical speculations about what constitutes life, and
so forth, shall settle the question?
Is my proposed argument in Roe in fact more satisfying than the
Court's opinion? If you find it so, I claim this is because some such
rationale was the true basis on which the judgment was reached and
that the resulting opinion-which avoids ethical argument-strains cre-
dulity precisely because no one would be convinced by its arguments. I
do not mean that the process of constitutional decision consists in
judges first making up their minds and then casting about for a suitable
doctrinal argument. That is often the accusation, indeed most often
when, as in Roe v. Wade, the doctrinal opinion is unconvincing. This is
wrong, and it is defamatory. It is rather that judges in such circum-
stances find a particular doctrinal argument persuasive precisely be-
cause they are being pulled by the unacknowledged force of
constitutional ethical argument. Indeed, only this can explain the
216. Thomson, A Defense ofAbortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971).
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choice of the poor rationale actually offered by the Court and a distin-
guished judge. One way to test this is to look at a recent case also
involving an abortion statute to see if the majority in that case relies on
the doctrinal arguments put forth in Roe, which is, after all, the gov-
erning precedent.
The Supreme Court handed down Colautti v. Franklin217 in Janu-
ary of 1979. There the Court struck down a Pennsylvania abortion law
that required physicians to try to preserve the life of a fetus if there
were "sufficient reason to believe that the fetus" might be viable.218 In
contrast to Roe, which concerned, I have claimed, the coercion of the
mother, the opinion in Colautti reaches its decision on grounds of the
statute's vagueness and its chilling effect on the rights of physicians.219
These grounds were studiously ignored in Roe, though they were as
relevant there as in Colautti, if the Court's approach-the right to an
abortion-were what truly led it to decision. Indeed, the grounds used
in Colautti had in fact been relied on by the lower court in Roe,22°
which makes their absence from the Supreme Court opinion in that
case, and their reemergence in Colautti, all the more telling. There is
virtually no argument-of any kind-in the Court's opinion in Roe v.
Wade. When direction is so sure, and argument so absent, it is because
we have made the arguments that gave us direction somehow unname-
able. But they continue to exert their force on us.
We shall have need to improve the structure of such arguments as
we approach the third century of our constitutional life. Whether a
state may offer chromosome "corrections," which are said to enhance
the "intelligence" of offspring, or whether a state may forbid the mar-
keting of such products; whether a state may, as Singapore continues to
do, read someone out of the welfare state because of that person's re-
fusal to voluntarily make certain life choices such as a particular family
size, or whether a state may someday be required to guarantee a certain
amount of government product based on family size; whether the fed-
eral government may, as has the CIA, secretly engage in drug experi-
mentation or openly attempt various strategies of "mind-control," as
for example in prisons, or whether government has a right of free
speech and may spend money on political propaganda; whether parents
will have a right to be allowed to choose the gender of their child, when
this is technologically feasible, or whether the state may regulate such
217. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
218. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977) (held unconstitutional).
219. 439 U.S. at 390-401.
220. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1223 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
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choices; these are, or soon will be, live constitutional questions. Even
the answer that the Constitution has nothing to do with these situations
is a constitutional answer. We will need ethical arguments in these
contexts in part because the other forms of constitutional argument are
not well adapted to them.
If I am correct in my assertion that the constitutional ethos of lim-
iting the means available to government can serve as the basis for as-
serting personal rights, and that the specific prohibitions of various
means in the Bill of Rights are necessarily and acknowledgedly only a
partial list, why do we need a Bill of Rights at all? It can scarcely be
that this formalization of rights in specific texts has made them inviola-
ble. Congress, after all, has made laws that abridge the freedom of
speech, and these are customarily upheld by the United States Supreme
Court. 2 Moreover, when Congress made no law, as in the Pentagon
Papers Case,22 2 this was so trivial a bar to Court action that it was not
even discussed.
Moreover, to some extent the fears of Madison and others that the
enumeration of specific rights would lead inevitably to the disparage-
ment of others have been fulfilled.223 Insofar as we treat the Bill of
Rights as the sole source, by enumeration or analogy, of constitutional
rights, we are contributing to the realization of these fears. Indeed, if
the function of the Bill of Rights were to generate a grammar of consti-
tutional arguments, as it does on a very small scale, for example, with
each new precedent, then it might be that we should not have had a Bill
of Rights. But making constitutional doctrine, like the decisions made
possible by those doctrines that adjudicate rights between parties, is not
the only function of a court, or of a constitution. One other function of
221. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). The Supreme Court never ruled on the
constitutionality of either the Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired 1800) (giving the Presi-
dent the power to deport aliens dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States) or the
Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801) (outlawing numerous, supposedly seditious
activities including writing, printing, uttering, or publishing anything false, scandalous, and mali-
cious with the intent to bring the government, the Congress, or the President into contempt or
disrepute). The constitutional validity of the Sedition Act, however, was sustained by the lower
federal courts and by three Supreme Court Justices sitting on circuit. See 1 T. EMERSON, D.
HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 38 (3d ed. 1967).
222. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See text accompanying notes
150-51 supra. Of course, it may be retorted that the jurisdictional statute by which the federal
courts could entertain such a suit is the needed "law" that Congress shall not make. This reply is,
I suggest, just the sort of strained explanation one gives for actions one really had not thought
about at the time.
223. For a collection of the views of those who opposed the inclusion of a bill of rights in the
Constitution, see I B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 189, at 527-53, 578-91.
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constitutional decision is an expressive one. To a discussion of this
function my third lecture is devoted. The Bill of Rights certainly per-
forms an expressive function: "The freedom of speech"; the "right of
the people to be secure in their persons"; the right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of an accusation; the absolute bar
against compelling him to be a witness against himself. These phrases
were plucked out of many by the first Congress. Their wording is more
economical and more poetic than that first proposed by Madison.2"4
They read quite unlike the other amendments of the Constitution, save
the fourteenth amendment with its graceful litany of immunities, and
equality and liberty, of process, protection, and privileges. The rest of
the amendments are largely mechanical, usually longer in text.
The particular Bill of Rights we have serves, and seems chosen to
serve, as more than a text for exegesis. It acts to give us a constitutional
motif, a cadence of our rights, so that, once heard, we can supply the
rest on our own.
III. Constitutional Expression
If tort law may be said to be a system of allocating the costs of
accidents, 225 and contract law a system of allocating the transaction
costs of market, decisions,226 then constitutional law may be thought of
as the allocation of roles-who is to have the authority to make what
sort of decision. One test, then, for failure of a constitutional system
would be how well its allocation of power worked. To take an extreme
example, I should think civil war an indictment of a particular constitu-
tional arrangement, just as the worst architecture, I have heard it said,
is that of a building that collapses. The most successful constitutional
order is one that encourages collaboration and harmony among the va-
rious constitutional institutions and actors.
With this notion we may have some basis from which to evaluate
constitutional rules. Do they encourage collaboration among citizens
for a common good? Do they maximize the availability of information
so that the possibilities of collaboration are recognized? Do they per-
mit shifting coalitions so that the opportunity costs for cooperation are
minimized? Indeed, one very ingenious defense of Roe v. Wade is that
it represents a particular allocation of the role of decisionmaker to the
pregnant woman, thereby putting the right of decision in the hands of
224. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 257-468 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789), portions reprinted in 2 B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 189, at 1012, 1016, 1023.
225. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
226. See, e.g., A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (1979).
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the one constitutional actor who has the most control as well as the
most information and the highest payoffs and costs. 227
The important thing to recognize about this view is that it is only
that-a view. It is an overlay-a simple descriptive mode that cannot
fully capture all the significant features of constitutional decision. It
captures one function of constitutional decision. It has particular short-
comings. These are principally two. It has too narrow a concept of
constitutional decisionmaking, and it assumes some general external
good that a third party observer may discern. The features of constitu-
tional law that account for these shortcomings are the richness of func-
tions served by constitutional decision and the actual ways in which
direction and change in constitutional development take place. These
two topics are the subjects of my final lecture.
In 1974 Grant Gilmore delivered the Storrs Lectures at the Yale
Law School. At the end of the final lecture, he spoke the lines that
have since become so famous:
Law reflects but in no sense determines the moral worth of a soci-
ety. The values of a reasonably just society will reflect them-
selves in a reasonably just law. The better the society, the less
law there will be. In Heaven there will be no law, and the lion
will lie down with the lamb. The values of an unjust society will
reflect themselves in an unjust law. The worse the society, the
more law there will be. In Hell there will be nothing but law, and
due process will be meticulously observed.228
This unforgettable passage, written in the elegant and polished irony of
Gilmore's prose, states a general thesis, which is, I think, quite wrong.
For what process we use does itself determine what sort of people we
are, and therefore there is a reflexiveness, a kinesthetic, mutually af-
fecting reaction between a society and its law.
Besides constitutional law, I also teach civil procedure. In that
class, there is, as you might expect, a good deal of talk about due proc-
ess. I have sometimes reminded my students of the importance due
process accords to the values of accuracy, efficiency, federalism, and
fair play. And yet, what is "fair play"? As an expression it is relatively
new to our language, arriving in common usage not much before the
time Shakespeare wrote.229 And its early uses230 leave no doubt that it
was a conjunction of ideas parallel to expressions like "fair maid" in
227. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term--Foreword" Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33-41 (1973).
228. G. GILMORE, THE AGEs OF AMERICAN LAW 110-11 (1977).
229. 4 THE OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY 27 (reissue supp. 1933).
230. See id.
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the phrase "Fair maid, send forth thine eye,"2 3 ' or "fair day," as in "a
fair day in summer; wondrous fair. '2 32 What then is fair play? It is
play-a serious game, if you will-that is fair, that is beautiful to us.
And foul play is that which revolts us. Because I do not believe we are
born with a taste for jury trials or the Australian ballot, I must assume
that our institutions play some role in establishing our aesthetic princi-
ples in these matters. The Constitution is first among such institutions.
And yet we must apply to it, in its construction, the very standards it
teaches us, knowing that even as we do so, we are creating a changed
institution that will, in turn, change us.
Constitutional decisionmaking has, therefore, an expressive func-
tion. Perhaps this is true for all societies. But it is truer still for ours.
The Constitution is our Mona Lisa, our Eiffel Tower, our Marseillaise.
This dynamic role is fulfilled by all constitutional actors. For example,
Lincoln's First Inaugural Address z33 may be taken as nothing more or
less than a constitutional decision-announced through a different me-
dium than a court opinion-that secession was not permitted by the
Constitution.3 The address, so moving in its efforts to persuade, and
so heartbreaking when set against subsequent events, is a series of con-
stitutional arguments, largely from text and structure, but also from
history and ethic, doctrine and prudence. For our purposes, it is most
important to note that since the address was not meant to guide future
deciders, that is, to serve as precedent, its arguments can exercise, as a
court's never quite can, a wholly expressive function. Lincoln calls on
the South to think of itself in the terms of its constitutional identity.
His decision that the Constitution does not permit secession and that
various national activities will continue to be maintained is not, of
course, insignificant. But no one can read those pages and miss the
point of the arguments. It is not simply to persuade but, by persuading,
to recast the conflict.
It is important, I think, to be reminded of the absolute requirement
of our system that each significant constitutional decider exercise his or
her judgment and not simply assume that all constitutional questions
are matters for the judiciary. Nevertheless, I have drawn my focus in
these lectures on judicial matters, and it is to a consideration of the
231. W. SHAKESPEARE, ALL'S WELL THAT ENDS WELL, act II, sc. iii, 1. 58.
232. W. SHAKESPEARE, PERICLES, PRINCE OF TYRE, act II, sc. v, 1. 36.
233. A. LINCOLN, First InauguralAddress, in 7 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT
3206 (1897).
234. Id. at 3208.
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Court-rather than the President or Congress-and its role in perform-
ing the expressive constitutional function to which I now turn.
First I want to point out how well suited our Supreme Court is to
fulfill an expressive role. For most of the life of the Court, there has
been a tradition of unanimity. This is crucial if the court is to be per-
ceived with clarity and with an undivided force. The strenuous efforts
of the Court to achieve unanimity in the Brown desegregation opin-
ion2 35 are evidence that the Court itself is not unmindful of this fact,
although the recent proliferation of opinions suggests that such virtues
are, at least for a time, not wholly controlling. Yet for a very long
period of our history, the Court either spoke through one opinion for
the entire Court, or through a single opinion not joined in by dissent-
ers. 1 36 Obviously, the splintering of the Court, and particularly of a
majority, renders an expressive role less credible. A second distinctive
feature of the Court is the provision for lifetime tenure.237 It can be
shown that the average length of years on the Supreme Court is less
than that of the average senior congressman's years in Congress, who,
far from having a lifetime appointment, must begin a new race only a
little after the old one is over.238 It is not, then, the length of service
that is significant. Two Republican Presidential terms after all were
enough to obtain a majority on the current Supreme Court. Rather, it
is the security the Justices are seen to have while they are on the bench
that is important. Lifetime tenure does not remove them from the po-
litical process so much as change how they are perceived within that
process. They are made secure so that they need not be expedient, so
that what they say can be believed to reflect their motives. In a politi-
cal system like ours, which requires a healthy and pervading skepticism
about political motives, this effect is indispensable.
Most interesting, and most illuminating, are those features in
which we differ from the English practice, because our departures were
deliberately chosen. It is largely to John Marshall that, as with so
much else, we owe a debt for halting the English practice of seriatim
opinions delivered orally and summarily reported and for replacing
235. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 596-616, 655-99 (1976).
236. See Seddig, John Marshall and the Origins of Supreme Court Leadersho, 36 U. PITr. L.
REv. 785, 800 (1975).
237. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
238. The average length of service for Supreme Court Justices, not including those serving at
present, is approximately 16 years. See A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERsKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED
JUSTICES app. at 104-09 (1978) (table one). The average length of service for the 25 most senior
Senators and the 75 most senior Representatives of the 96th Congress, as of January 1979, was
approximately 21 years. See 37 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 52, 52-55 (1979).
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them with a written opinion for the whole Court.2 3 9 Only once in Jay's
tenure was this done, and this, in the important jurisdictional case aris-
ing from the Neutrality Proclamation,2 40 seems to have been done in
part to evade giving reasons for the decision.241 Jay's successor, Ells-
worth, tried to eliminate the seriatim practice, but his absence on a mis-
sion to France in 1800 provided an opportunity for backsliding, so that
when Marshall was sworn in the following year, the practice of deliver-
ing seriatim opinions was still in some use.242
Marshall at once began urging their abandonment and replace-
ment by a single, written opinion.243 This, for two reasons, was a cru-
cial step in permitting the Court to exercise an expressive function.
First, it allowed the Court to speak with a single voice so that its
message would be unqualified and the prestige of that message corre-
spondingly enhanced. Second, the "quest for a single opinion inevita-
bly increased the importance of bargaining and persuasion among the
justices. '' 2  This meant that whatever statement finally gained consen-
sus would reflect more than the attitudes of a single person, and this
increased considerably the proximity an opinion was likely to have to
the views shared by the great mass of the people.
The expressive function-which is in part to recreate national ide-
als-was also enhanced by a second departure from English practice.
This was the assumption, from the beginning- of our constitutional life,
that the Court could overrule precedent. 245 This allows the Court to
shift from supporting one view to another, contrary one when the latter
appears more compelling; this prevents the Court from being locked
into a single view. Without this flexibility, no Court could wisely un-
dertake an expressive function, since conflicting truths will, from time
to time, require reinforcement at each other's expense. 246 This feature
of the Court's operation is perhaps most important, since it permits the
239. See J. SHIRLEY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASES AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 309-10 (1895).
240. Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794).
241. 1 J. GOEBEL, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 765 (1971).
242. Id. at 778.
243. See J. SHIRLEY, supra note 239, at 310.
244. Seddig, supra note 236, at 796.
245. Indeed, there is no discussion of this point in Mason v. Eldred, 73 U.S. (6 Wall) 231
(1867), the first express overruling, which unanimously overruled Sheehy v. Mandeville, 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) 235 (1810), nor in the controversial Legal Tender Cases, 78 U.S. (I I Wall.) 682 (1870);
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870), overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869),
decided only the previous year. The Court merely states that "it is no unprecedented thing in
courts of last resort, both in this country and in England, to overrule decisions previously made."
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 554.
246. See G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, supra note 176, at 195-99.
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Court to be a conduit of change. At the same time, the existence of
various constitutional arguments-the conventions discussed in the
first lecture-allows differing parties each to claim the Constitution as
its own. And so, over time, it is the ability to overrule precedent that
enables the Court to achieve this expression of values. To quote Law-
rence's remark about the novel: "It can inform and lead into new
places the flow of our sympathetic consciousness, and can lead our
sympathy away in recoil from things that are dead."247
But one's view of the function of a court's decision often depends
upon one's preference for particular constitutional arguments. So, for
example, Charles Black wrote: "Judicial review has two prime func-
tions-that of imprinting governmental action with the stamp of legiti-
macy, and that of checking the political branches of government when
these encroach on ground forbidden to them by the Constitution as
interpreted by the Court. ' 248 This account reflects Black's structural
perspective; 249 you will recall that in the first lecture I said that each of
the different kinds of argument implied a particular justification for
judicial review.2 10 For example, historical argument suggests a sort of
social contract between government and the people, with the original
intention of both parties determining the construction of that instru-
ment-the written Constitution-which is the memorialization of the
contract. Courts then, reflecting this view, examine legislation to see if
it comports with the original understanding of the parties. They exer-
cise solely- a checking function, reviewing legislative action to check it
against the original charter. Structural argument also implies a justifi-
cation for judicial review. A court exercises a legitimating force with
respect to legislation it necessarily, if inadvertently, validates in the
process of applying it; and, of course, there could be no real legitima-
tion without the power to invalidate.
One's view of the functions of the Supreme Court is as much a
product of the approach one adopts to the Constitution, then, as are
one's convictions about the proper foundation of judicial review. Pro-
fessor Kurland has written that he doubts whether any such legitimat-
ing function is really exercised.2 11 Professor Bickel, on the other hand,
took up the legitimating idea so thoroughly that he would have added
yet another function to describe the Supreme Court's role when it
247. Quoted in J. UPDIKE, PICKED Up PIECES 29 (1966).
248. C. BLACK, supra note 138, at 223 (emphasis added).
249. See text accompanying notes 120-21 supra.
250. See text following notes 3, 136-38 supra.
251. Kurland, Book Review, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 188 (1960).
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wishes neither to check nor to legitimate. 2 I think of this as a refer-
ring or remanding function, and I need hardly add that this is using a
method in a prudentialist's way. For my own part I should like to draw
attention to still other functions of the Court. First, just to break the
spell that there are only one or two functions of judicial review, I will
discuss briefly the "cueing function" in constitutional law. I would like
to do this in the context of a single, concrete case so that you may
appreciate the difference it makes whether a decision is attributed to
one function or another.
On June 24, 1976, the Supreme Court handed down National
League of Cities v. Usery.253 At issue were the 1974 amendments to the
Fair Labor Standards Act, by which the Act's minimum wage and
maximum hours provisions were extended to state employees. The
Court determined that these amendments would displace the states'
freedom to structure operations in areas of traditional authority, by
vastly increasing the expense of police protection, sanitation, fire pre-
vention, and the like, and by limiting the choices of how they are to be
provided.
The opinion in National League of Cities was met by considerable
adverse commentary.1 4 Many persons-including four members of
the Court255 -felt that this decision was a step back to the pre-New
Deal era in which the Court routinely found reasons to limit the exer-
cise of Congress' commerce power. Some said that National League of
Cities cast doubt on the landmark Darby case,256 which had virtually
ended the invalidation of social legislation when Congress acts pursu-
ant to its commerce powers. The case is indeed troubling if one as-
sumes that it represents a new point at which the checking function is
to be exercised.
But assume for a moment that this decision serves a different func-
tion, that of a cue to some other constitutional actor. Begin with the
view that officials in each of the three branches of the federal govern-
ment have the burden under the Constitution of judging their own ac-
252. A. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 29-33.
253. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
254. See, e.g., Comment, At Federalism's Crossroads National League of Cities v. Usery, 57
B.U.L. REv. 178 (1977); Note, Federalism andthe Commerce Clause: National League of Cities v.
Usery, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1189 (1977); Comment, Applying the Equal Pay Act to State and Local
Governments.- The Effect of National League of Cities v. Usery, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 665 (1977); 25
EMORY L.J. 937 (1976); 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 152 (1976); 8 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 403 (1976). See
also Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a- Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial
Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977).
255. 426 U.S. at 856 (Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); id. at 880 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
256. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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tions according to the limits and restraints placed on them by the
Constitution.257 Their oaths of office demand as much. And the pre-
sumption of constitutionality that courts extend to legislation validly
passed and signed into law, as well as the judiciary's aversion to in-
quiry into legislative motivation, necessitates some kind of constitu-
tional review by each of the nonjudicial branches.
In at least one constitutional role, however, Congress has special
responsibilities. Herbert Wechsler has written persuasively of the im-
portant part played by the states in the selection and composition of
Congress. 258 More is involved here than just the obvious facts that the
Senate is drawn wholly from a state constituency and that the state
legislatures decide districting for the House. The perception of com-
mon interests, the background and associations of elected officials, the
influence of local business and political interests are but a few of the
factors that, as Madison clearly foresaw,259 so aptly fit Congress to ex-
ercise the restraint of the local against the centripetal force of the na-
tional.
If we assume with Wechsler and Madison that the protection of
the states' sovereignty is primarily the work of Congress, we need not
conclude, with the dissent that cites Wechsler,26 ° that the majority in
NationalLeague of Cities is wrong. Instead, we may come to think that
the case is not a major doctrinal turn, but a cue to a fellow constitu-
tional actor, and encouragement to Congress that it renew its tradi-
tional role as protector of the states. The case does not threaten
invalidating legislation per se, so much as it argues for a different con-
struction of the Constitution, particularly for a sturdier federalism.
There are several reasons why Congress' role as protector of federalism
has been neglected lately, not the least of which, as a perusal of the
Congressional Record and various committee reports confirms, is the
popular conception of the Court's decision in Wickard v. Filburn.26'
The frequency and looseness with which the "Wheat Case" has come
to be mentioned in Congress as proof that there are no limitations on
the commerce power has contributed to the stultification of Congress'
role. National League of Cities changed all that, as Congress' apparent
change of heart regarding the extension of Social Security to state
257. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 352-54 (1975); Linde,
Without "Due Process, " 49 OR. L. REv. 125, 125-31 (1970).
258. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role ofthe States in the Composi-
tion and Selection ofthe National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 546-52 (1954).
259. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (J. Madison) 288-89 (Lodge ed. 1888).
260. 426 U.S. at 877 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Wechsler, supra note 258).
261. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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workers reflects.2 62 Moreover, the cue was taken by the Executive as
well. 263 But how do we know it was just a cue, and what difference
does it make?
My thesis is, unlike so many, testable. If the Court were exercising
a cueing function in National League of Cities, then we would not ex-
pect to see the Court granting certiorari in cases that present a develop-
ment of the doctrine announced in that case. We would expect to see
little development of it in the cases taken on appeal; indeed, its citation
would be virtually absent, except in dicta. Finally, if we were lucky, we
might even encounter a case presenting a substantial National League
of Cities issue that the Court chose wholly to ignore. What do we find?
We find virtually no development of this potentially major doctrinal
change. There have been no National League of Cities cases taken up
by the Court since that case was decided. And in the case of City of
LaFayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. ,264 which applied the federal
antitrust laws to state municipalities, there is not even a reference to
National League of Cities, despite its discussion in both briefs, at oral
argument, and, clearly enough, its relevance to the decision that fol-
lowed.265 Much of the commentary on National League of Cities, then,
if my view is correct, is wholly irrelevant, and therefore it makes a great
difference which function the Court was exercising.
I have treated you to this excursion because I wanted to give an
example of a different function than the onds commonly discussed.
However, I shall caution that my enumeration of these various func-
tions is not exhaustive; I do not purport to give a complete list. Each
function appears to us only by contrast with the others-just as Bickel's
referral function only appears once one accepts Black's legitimating
262. H.R. 13040, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. H9481 (1976).
263. The recent internal Executive debate about the extension of FLSA regulations to mass
transit workers is squarely the result. See Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at
19-23, San Antonio Metro Transit Auth. v. Marshall, Civ. Act. No. SA-79-CA-457 (W.D. Tex.,
filed Nov. 21, 1979).
264. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
265. See discussion in PREVIEW OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES (ALI-ABA) No.
6, at 6 (Oct. 10, 1977). In a footnote, Justice Brennan wrote: "Our emphasis today in our conclu-
sion, that municipalities are 'exempt' from antitrust enforcement when acting as state agencies
implementing state policies to the same extent as the State itself makes it difficult to see how
National League of Cities is even tangentially implicated." 435 U.S. at 413 n.42. But it does not
follow, even if this statutory construction permits the Court to avoid reaching the constitutional
issue, that National League of Cities underlying rationale can be so effortlessly limited to states
and not their subdivisions when the latter are anything other than "state agencies implementing
state policies to the same extent as the State itself." Id. Five members of the Court, on both sides
of the antitrust issue, would appear to agree. See id. at 423-24 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at
430-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by White, Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ.). For similar avoid-
ance maneuvers, see EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
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function, just as one can only see certain colors when they are next to
others. Let us then turn to an examination of the expressive function at
work in several well-known, much-written-about constitutional cases.
The school prayer case-School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp26 6-was perhaps, with the Miranda67 decision, the most con-
troversial Supreme Court case of the 1960s. Unlike Miranda, however,
it is widely disobeyed.268 Does this mean that it is an example of poor
constitutional deciding, like collapsing architecture, and if so, can this
be related to an erroneous choice of function by the Court, analogous
to the erroneous choice made by commentators on the NationalLeague
of Cities opinion?
On February 14, 1958, three students in the public schools of Ab-
ington Township, Pennsylvania, and their parents, filed a complaint
alleging that the school district and its employees were violating the
students' religious consciences by causing the Bible to be read in the
classrooms of the Township, as required by a Pennsylvania statute.
The three children were from one family, the Schempps. On Septem-
ber 16, 1959, a three-judge court declared the Pennsylvania statute un-
constitutional. 269 Its conclusion that the statute violated both the free
exercise and establishment clauses of the first amendment was predi-
cated on a factual finding that attendance at the Bible readings by all
pupils and participation by teachers were compulsory. In December
the legislature of Pennsylvania, in an effort to eliminate the compulsory
features of the statute, amended it to provide that any child could be
excused from Bible reading or attending Bible reading.27' The legisla-
ture's action prompted the Supreme Court to vacate and remand the
suit to the three-judge court. 72 In February 1962, after a very brief
trial, that court declared the amended statute unconstitutional. 73 The
court evidently thought that it could avoid the effect of the amend-
ment-by which the legislature had sought to remove the common ele-
ment of compulsion that tied the establishment and free exercise claims
together-by limiting the grounds of the decision to the establishment
clause. The first case had held that the Schempp children could not
266. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
267. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
268. See Katz, Patterns of Compliance with the Schempp Decision, 14 J. PuB. L. 396, 402
(1965).
269. Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township, 177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
270. Id. at 406-08.
271. See Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township, 184 F. Supp. 318, 382 (E.D. Pa.
1960).
272. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 364 U.S. 298 (1960).
273. Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township, 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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exercise their freedom not to repeat doctrines that were distasteful to
them. Now, in the second case, the court held that regardless of a lack
of compulsion, the simple reading of the Bible per se constituted an
establishment of religion. 74
In the Supreme Court this holding was affirmed, Justice Clark
writing for the majority. 7 5 His is a purely doctrinal argument, distil-
ling a test from earlier cases, and wholly ignoring the lengthy historical
arguments that had characterized earlier discussions of the first amend-
ment clauses at issue. His opinion is straightforward; roughly, the ar-
gument goes like this: (1) the relevant case law requires a "wholesome
'neutrality'" by the state;276 (2) the test of this neutrality can be
summed up, from the cases, as a simple matter of legislative intent and
statutory effect; 277 (3) the three-judge panel's finding of fact that the
readings, even though not required by law, were a religious ceremony
and constituted the promotion of public religiousness permits the
Supreme Court to infer a compatible legislative motive.278 Thus, the
statute was struck down since the legislature was taken to have estab-
lished a particular religion in Abington Township.
There are many critical things one may say about this opinion, and
most have been said. But perhaps most damning to any doctrinal argu-
ment is a dissent that relies on the same principle asserted in the major-
ity. So it is troubling that Justice Stewart announced that he too was
asserting a neutrality thesis. Justice Stewart's dissent in Schemp 27 9 ar-
gues that the construction required by the majority to create an estab-
lishment issue would trigger a free exercise issue on the other side,
which would save the statute. In other words, forbidding states to take
any measures that make available, without compulsion, religious
materials or exercises, denies parents the right to exercise freely their
religious convictions. A bona fide neutrality, on this view, is offended
by a kind of state secularism, since those children whose parents cannot
afford parochial schools are prevented from receiving an important ele-
ment of their religious upbringing.
Which is the correct position? I do not believe one can arrive at
the answer by these arguments. The fundamental error in these com-
peting neutrality theses is that there is no way to choose between them
by relying on the principle both assert. As a principle, a neutrality the-
274. Id. at 818-19.
275. 374 U.S. at 217-22.
276. Id. at 222.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 222-23.
279. Id. at 308.
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sis is of no help whatsoever, because we have no adequate notion of
generality on which a neutrality thesis, if it is to guide decision, must
depend.
Recently it came to my attention that a litigant actually challenged
the motto, "In God We Trust," that is engraved on United States coin-
age.2 80 At first it may seem simple to say that the primary purpose of
the coins is to provide a medium of exchange and not to advance a
particular sectarian view. But that assumes that the level of generality
is fixed on the coin. One could just as well ask what the primary pur-
pose of the motto is. Or suppose we allow a conscientious objector to
absent himself from military training. If a legislature does this it is
plainly open to the charge of recognizing the particular set of religions
whose scruples include objection to war. But if a legislature refuses to
make such provisions, the objector quite plausibly can go to court and
say that induction and service will infringe his free exercise rights. It is
hard to see any decision concerning religious groups or individuals that
does not commit a resource to, or withdraw it from, religions. Recent
news stories of men allowing themselves to be bitten by poisonous
snakes remind us that even a simple game statute may have an anti-
religious effect on some sects. That Clark and Stewart should have
determined that the first amendment's purpose was the enforcement of
neutral principles was a fatal, if ironic, step in pursuit of satisfactory
doctrine. Of course, this pursuit is necessary if checking or referring
functions are to be adequately performed. In either case guidance must
be given to others, viz, the lower courts and the legislatures.
But assume for a moment that a different function is to be
served-an expressive function. We want, then, in the school prayer
context, a statement that characterizes the society and its rules, but that
does not, by itself, set up a general rule for development in the lower
courts. At the outset, let me say that the first amendment religion
clauses are well suited-by their history, not by chance-to be the vehi-
cle of the Court's expressive function. The great prohibitions against
Congress making a law respecting the establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof did not apply to the states, where
established churches were a live possibility, and in some states, a real-
ity. Their value was chiefly heuristic. It was not that Jefferson feared
an American inquisition. Rather he sought that elevation of projected
purity into present virtue by which nations are often forged.
It is useful to remember that the constitutional text contains only
280. See O'Hair v. Blumenthal, 462 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
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three references to the deity, and two of these are quite remote: (1) the
clause excluding Sundays for purposes of determining the period of
time within which the President must exercise his veto;28' (2) the dating
of the document above the framers' signatures as "in the Year of Our
Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven"; and (3) the third
clause of article VI proscribing religious tests for office.282 As Richard
Morgan wrote after noting this paucity of religious reference:
The absence of any positive reference to God was not accidental.
It was. . . much remarked on at the time and blamed, by that
dour Federalist Timothy Dwight, President of Yale, on Jefferson.
• . . Under Washington's chairmanship [of the Constitutional
Convention] there were no invocations, and when Benjamin
Franklin (himself no orthodox Christian) moved that the meeting
pray for divine guidance, he was defeated. 83
With such a background, it is hardly surprising that the debate in the
First Congress about the adoption of the religion clauses did not center
on their usefulness as checks on likely national abuses. And thus, from
the very start, these clauses held the potential for a heuristic, expressive
use.
I do not want to write an opinion for you in Schempp. I will sim-
ply say that if this function, rather than either of the ones chosen by
majority or dissenter in that case, had been adopted, the resulting opin-
ion would have been quite different. The holding would have been
based on the uniqueness of that quintessentially American institution,
the public school, and its crucial role in our culture as framer and
builder of the attitudes by which we, its products, characterize our-
selves and our relation to organized society. It is not the religiosity of
these prayers-mostly mumbled by sleepy children or ignored by ado-
lescents preoccupied with less pious pursuits-it is not that which
should disturb us. It is their inclusion in the school context. Not neu-
trality in and of itself, but abstinence in such a context is required. The
Court's decision, however, calls into question-indeed summons into
litigation--everything from charitable donations to the designation of
Army chaplains.
Well, perhaps you would have written a different opinion. But
what I want you to recognize is that, even with the weak and uncom-
pelling doctrines of both sides in Schempp and an erroneous choice of
functions, the case has nevertheless come to exercise a powerful expres-
sive function. It is the statement of a new, secular national society.
281. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
282. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
283. R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 20-21 (1972).
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That its mandate has been largely ignored in the public schools and
that the Court has shown little inclination to exploit its checking poten-
tial further suggests to me that its importance is now perceived even by
the Court as principally an expressive one.
Many commentators have asked why the Court would grant certi-
orari in such sensitive, controversial cases as Schempp when the Jus-
tices must have known that their decision would be met with hostility
by the vast majority of Americans. After posing this question, which
concerns popular response, scholarly analysts answer it in a most
nonpopular way: whatever the reaction, it is said, "for most Americans
• . . the vitality of these . . . decisions . . . must depend upon [the]
intrinsic persuasiveness" of the constitutional arguments offered.284
This answer is just as unlikely, it seems to me, as the opposite view that
the arguments of an opinion are largely irrelevant and that only popu-
lar acceptance can justify a particular exercise of judicial review.2 85
If we accept the expressive function of the Court, then it must
sometimes be in advance of and even in contrast to, the largely incho-
ate notions of the people generally. The Court's role in the exercise of
this function, after all, is to give concrete expression to the unarticu-
lated values of a diverse nation. So we must approach decisions that
have this function as their principal justification with a different eye for
their arguments. We need not entertain the fiction that the opinions
will be pored over in every hamlet and town meeting. Nor need we
abandon the care for craft. To the contrary, once we recognize the
function, we know better how to craft the argument. There are other
examples of the Court acting in this expressive way in major constitu-
tional opinions.
For example, I do not think the decision in United States v.
Nixon,2 8 6 the Tapes Case, can be understood, much less justified, on
any basis other than as an expressive one. In contrast to other weak
doctrinal opinions, the Tapes Case is notable for the diffidence with
which it has been treated. But I venture to say that it is the worst set of
doctrinal arguments, the least convincing, the most easily refuted, brief
but repetitious, bombastic but unmoving, one is likely to encounter in
the pages of the United States Reports. Yet the outcome in United
States v. Nixon is right because it expresses a national goal captured by
the cliches "a government of laws, not men," and "equal justice under
laws." The holding in the Tapes Case is not the preposterous one
284. Pollak, Public Prayers in Public Schools, 77 HARV. L. REV. 62, 64 (1963).
285. Deutsch, supra note 74, at 235-36.
286. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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stated by the Court-that an assertion of privilege must be balanced
against a prosecutor's need for evidence in a criminal trial, this balance
to be struck by a preliminary inspection of documents or tapes.287 The
real holding is that a President, as chief executive officer, may not ma-
nipulate the instrumentalities of law enforcement both to prevent the
law's enforcement and to acquit himself. To have ruled in the opposite
way would have forever given strength to the view that the President is
the sole and ultimate arbiter of the prosecution of the law, even when it
means that he sits as judge in his own case. This is not really a holding
since it is at once confined to the unique facts of a President's appoint-
ment of someone to prosecute him and his claims that the very material
he said was privileged would exculpate him, and yet, as a principle, it is
as unconfined as any great national ideal.
There are other decisions that may, as well, be usefully analyzed in
this way. The magnificent statements that "[l]egislators represent peo-
ple, not trees or acres"288 and that they "are elected by voters, not
farms or cities or economic interests 289 are scarcely accurate as de-
scriptions. But they do fulfill an expressive role. We may disagree
about whether the issue is best thought of as one involving equal pro-
tection or the guaranty of republican government g. But by either ap-
proach, we may at the same time call for "one man, one vote" without
being reduced to mathematical formulae, if we remember that the role
of the Court in such a case is principally expressive and not checking.
These cases are no less "effective" if they rely on constitutional actors
other than courts to give them life. Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon
Supreme Court, then a law professor, wrote with characteristic insight
when he derided the narrow view of the Court's effectiveness and
called for a recognition of the significance of a constitutional holding
for its own sake. 9 ' What would be the implications, Linde asked, of a
decision saying that a bit of organized public prayer never hurt anyone;
that a little inequality of voting rights did not matter as long as the state
thought it served a useful purpose in some larger scheme of things; that
it was no injustice to ransack someone's home or wire it from floor to
ceiling if the evidence obtained proved him guilty of a crime; or that
difficulties of effective schooling, of peaceful public recreation, or of
mixed-race families might on occasion justify evenhanded segrega-
287. Id. at 711-13.
288. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
289. Id.
290. See W. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 270-81 (1972).
291. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972).
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tion?2 9 2 The value at stake is far more than programmatic effective-
ness. Linde recognized that such holdings "would shape people's
vision of their Constitution and of themselves."2 93 This is the function
of the Court's work that I have been calling "expressive."
If you have the same negative reaction I have when I repeat
Linde's imaginary holdings, you might ask yourself why that is. Of
course no court, deciding the cases to which he refers, need have made
the statements Linde derives by negating their actual holdings. I think
that we have this reaction because the Court's expressive function has
already worked its way into our constitutional sense. And thus Linde's
questions are not only examples of the expressive function, but, taken
as a whole, are an example.
Jorge Luis Borges has written: "Sometimes at evening there's a
face that sees us from the deeps of a mirror. Art must be that sort of
mirror, disclosing to each of us his face."
The Constitution functions this way. How is this related to the
various sorts of argument discussed in my first lecture? For one thing,
whenever an ethical argument is advanced in an appropriate situation,
its very advancement-the very fact of its avowal and assertion-serves
an expressive function. It says: "We are such people as would decide
matters on this basis"--while at the same time it works toward a deci-
sion that may serve an expressive function.
Also, ethical argument changes through time as the constitutional
ethos changes. How does this happen? In part, I would say, because of
the expressive functions served by various constitutional actors. So
there is a double relation here: ethical argument is a powerful ap-
proach to the exercise of the expressive function, while that function
has, in large measure, determined the availability and force and focus
of ethical arguments. Take, for example, the famous Bakke2 94 case. It
seems to me that the expressive function of the Court is properly dis-
charged by a statement that race, by itself, will not do as the basis by
which people are to be judged. Imagine, if you doubt this, a different
statement, "Race can sometimes be used to discriminate," or "Color
can be used as a sole sufficient criterion for treating people differently
if the color is black." I believe I appreciate the persuasive arguments
that may be advanced for affirmative action, and I certainly think that
292. Id. at 238.
293. Id.
294. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). For a different view of this
case, see Calabresi, Bakke as Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 CATH. L. REv. 427 (1979).
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black people and women and Indians may claim a unique constitu-
tional status. But think, for a moment, not just of the arguments but of
the function, and the fact that Bakke does not render affirmative action
impermissible.
I would not, however, like to tie ethical argument and the expres-
sive function too closely.295 My taxonomy of conventions is neither
comprehensive nor clearcut. The various arguments I described often
occur in combination. This is also true of the functions. Furthermore,
the conventions that allow us to make arguments of different kinds are
each themselves aspects of an expressive function that is reasserted
whenever the relevant argument is used. Thus, the simple assertion of
an historical argument is also the expression of a continuity of tradi-
tion, a fidelity to our forefathers' legacy to us, an acknowledgement of
the modesty of our perspective and the limits of our wisdom, a state-
ment that constitutional institutions are faithful as they are constitu-
tional.
At the same time, while the various arguments seem to depend
upon the conflict of their approaches for their existence, their role in
serving an expressive function changes them. In the same poem I
quoted above, Borges has written: "Art is endless like a river flowing,
passing, yet remaining, a mirror to the same inconstant Heraclitus, who
is the same and yet another, like the river flowing."
This concludes my consideration of constitutional argument and
the functions of constitutional decisions. I will now draw from that
consideration conclusions to four questions about the Constitution: (1)
how it changes; (2) how it determines arguments; (3) how it brings
about decisions; (4) how it legitimizes them. First, how does constitu-
tional change come about? Change comes to the Constitution through
many different channels and is mediated by different agencies. The
most frequent processes are the incremental corrections in course that
courts make as they confront unanticipated fact situations and must
apply old rules reconsidered in their light. As both the interstitial and
the reviewed methods of change operate from the past, they also oper-
ate on the past. It has been remarked that every artist creates his own
precursors.296 I must read Keats differently having read Yeats and per-
haps read both differently having read Auden. So I must read Pierce297
and Meyer298 differently having read Griswold299 and must read them
295. See text accompanying notes 221-24 supra.
296. See, e.g., H. BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE (1973).
297. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
298. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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all differently having read Roe.3°
Yet re-cognition differs from the incremental working-out of doc-
trine because it acts to make available different arguments. Thus, the
work of Calabresi 30 1 may truly be called seminal, since it brought to the
academy a different analysis, which, in the pattern of ideas circulating
between the three branches of our profession, will find its way into
acceptable argument in accepted opinions. The opinions will be ac-
cepted first as fragments for higher courts mending their own internal
conflicts, and later, again, by lower courts trying to explain the rules
that are the product of those conflicts, and later still by the temporary
finality that occurs when a particular case is over. That acceptance will
make such arguments part of the functioning perception of problems
by lawyers. As Nelson Goodman has written: "[Flor reality in a
world, like realism in a picture, is largely a matter of habit. 302
There is also the rare, utterly transforming change that shatters the
existing symmetry. In constitutional law, the Civil War was such a
change. Yet one of the analytical changes it brought about underscores
the point that constitutional approaches often differ in response to the-
oretical rather than practical needs. The development of substantive
due process, and the response this development called forth from con-
stitutional conventions of argument-the mistaken superimposition on
the states of the federal model of enumerated powers-that gave us the
notorious Lochner decision,303 is one example I have in mind. Then
the transforming constitutional event becomes less important than the
change by which we know it. It has been said that Thucydides' Pelo-
ponnesian War has replaced the war itself since the latter can't stay in
print.
These constitutional transformations do not give us new conven-
tions, new approaches. They change the context in which these con-
ventions are applied, and therefore, the sense of fit that each will
provide in a particular setting. I do not wish anyone to think that a
particular approach is correct, legitimate, or true in a way the others
are not. Indeed, it is one of the fortunate results of these conventions
that there is no one truth outside of them. This allows our institutions
to take advantage of the insight captured in a remark by Niels Bohr
299. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381'U.S. 479 (1965).
300. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
301. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 225; Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation
andLiability Rules: A Comment, 11 J.L. & Econ. 67 (1968); Calabresi, The Decisionfor Accidents:
4n Approach to Non-fault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965).
302. N. GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING 20 (1978).
303. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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that the opposite of a correct statement is a false statement, but the
opposite of a profound truth may well be another profound truth.304
Second, how do the various kinds of arguments discussed earlier
come about? The various constitutional approaches I have discussed
are made possible by corresponding features of our Constitution. A
textual argument is possible only because we have a written Constitu-
tion; it is the Constitution's "written-ness," if you will, that enables tex-
tual approaches. Historical arguments are possible because the
Constitution was proposed by a deliberative body, campaigned for, and
ratified by the people, instead of being imposed on the people or an-
nounced as law by fiat. Structural arguments work because the Consti-
tution establishes three principal, fundamental structures of
authority-the three-branch system of national government, the two-
layer system of federalism, and the citizen-state relationship. Pruden-
tial arguments are a result of our Constitution's rationalist superstruc-
ture of means and ends, of enumerated powers and implied methods,
which impose a calculation of benefits. Doctrinal arguments are possi-
ble only because of the imposition of the federal courts into the consti-
tutional process. Ethical arguments arise from the ethos of limited
government, from the "limited-ness" of our Constitution.
In each of these features the American Constitution was unique.
Because these features inhere in it, and make the various approaches
possible, each generation of constitutionalists will sort itself into styles
corresponding to the kinds of arguments. I have mentioned Bruce Ack-
erman30 5 in this regard as an exemplar of a prudential approach; I must
also add his contemporaries, Paul Brest306 and John Ely,30 7 as repre-
sentative of the doctrinal and structural traditions, respectively. Hans
Linde's articles30 8 reflect a textual approach.
A particular problem is more or less suited to a particular ap-
proach when the factual features of the problem bear a certain relation-
ship to the correspondent factual feature of the Constitution that gives
rise to the approach. For example, the question whether a state may
enforce its own statute when to do so conflicts with a federal statute is a
problem that is singularly appropriate to a textual approach, since it
shares a particular factual feature with a written rule in the Constitu-
304. N. BOHR, Discussion with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics, in
ATOMIC PHYSICS AND HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 66 (1958).
305. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, supra note 109.
306. See, e.g., P. BREST, supra note 257.
307. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Ely, Towarda Representation-Rein-
forcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451 (1978).
308. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 291.
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tion, namely the competition for supremacy that article VI settles in
favor of the federal statute.309
I am not claiming here that every constitutional problem presents
a single question that will have a perspicuous factual feature which, on
inspection, will turn out to be neatly paired with a particular constitu-
tional feature and hence a particular sort of constitutional argument. I
am arguing, instead, that the chance concatenation of numerous events
makes one sort of constitutional argument work in a particular context.
When we throw dice, it has been observed, we do not suspend the law
of dynamics. Moreoever, a convention's development may make cer-
tain facts appear for the first time, or at least give them relevance for
decisionmaking. For example, recall the defensive maneuvers Bickel
prescribed for the Supreme Court.310  Like the small fish, the
photoblepharon, who emits light from window-like openings beneath
its eyes, the Court, when threatened or when unsure, was to swim in a
zig-zag fashion with lights on during the zig and lights off during the
zag. The Court had been exploiting these "passive virtues," Bickel
said, but unconsciously and infrequently. Of course, once Bickel told
the Court this is what they had been doing, they. began doing it in ear-
nest. The "fact" of arguable mootness in the DeFunis31I reverse dis-
crimination case-a fact that, as Bickel himself neglected even to
anticipate or refer to in his amicus briefs for the Anti-Defamation
League,312 and one that hardly would have detained the Court for a
paragraph in another case-became the basis for the Court's ruling.
This is the topological feature of constitutional analysis-the corre-
spondence between chance, factual features of constitutional problems
and features of the Constitution itself.
Third, how does constitutional decision come about? Do judges
and commentators decide to adopt a particular approach, or does the
Constitution require one approach rather than another? To the extent
that one is attracted to natural law, it will perhaps seem that the choice
of a particular approach is a matter of finding which approach, latent
in the Constitution, is most suitable for a particular problem. To the
extent one is attracted to positivist or existentialist perspectives, it will
309. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
310. See text accompanying notes 95-101 supra.
311. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam).
312. See Brief of Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Jurisdictional Statement or in the Alternative Petition for Certiorari, reprinted in 1 DEFUNIS V.
ODEGAARD AND THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, THE UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS CASE (A.
Ginger ed. 1974); Brief of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith Amicus Curiae, reprinted in
2 id. at 465.
770
Vol. 58:695, 1980
Constitutional Fate
often seem that the choice of one of these approaches is a creative deci-
sion which, over time, yields an artifact that is the body of law expres-
sing this approach. Some judicial activity appears to support both
views. I have discussed how particular factual features of a problem
suit it to treatment by a particular approach. However, I also discussed
the relationship between a particular approach and the function served
by a single decision displaying this approach. It was my conclusion
that the choice of a particular function often determines which conven-
tions are appropriate. To the layman, without these conventions, all
legal opinions will appear to be creative acts, choices. The constitu-
tional arguments appear to be just plain arguments. To a judge or
commentator working within a particular convention, its application
will appear to be determined for us. This accounts for the genuine
sincerity of judges who claim they only "apply" the law.
Both are wrong. Of course, legal truths exist within a convention.
But the conventions themselves are possible only because of the consti-
tutional object-the document, its history, the decisions construing it-
and because of the larger culture, with whom the various constitutional
functions serve to assure a fluid, two-way effect on the ongoing process
of constitutional meaning. We. have, therefore, a participatory Consti-
tution.
What are the features of this Constitution? First, the present must
to some extent control the past. Otherwise one's decisions are either
determined by precedent, or we are forced to reject precedent and be-
gin fresh. Second, the various conventions must have arisen, must have
come into being, with the Constitution. They cannot be "natural" or
have any a priori status. Third, the chance concatenations of facts that
precipitate a constitutional decision must give rise to participation by
observers, so that they are changed by it and they can communicate
these changes in plain language. This participation, because it is two-
way, gives tangible reality -to the Constitution. By participation and
observation I do not mean acquiescence. It is difficult to state just
where this community of observer-participants ends, as the expressive
function reminds us.
Our Constitution satisfies these conditions. The present does in
part control the past. For example, Justice Douglas' use in Griswold3 '3
of the Meyer314 and Pierce3 15 cases as first amendment precedents
might strike a law review editor as unprincipled or at least highly crea-
313. Griswold v. Connecticut, 318 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965).
314. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
315. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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tive. The first amendment is not even cited in Meyer. But after such a
use by the Court, Meyer becomes a first amendment precedent, and,
indeed, may now be seen as the decisive first step in the development of
a first amendment doctrine of freedom of ideas. The present use of
precedent transforms it, and the earlier case must then be read in light
of the use to which it is later put.
Finally, the Constitution is a sort of self-exciting circuit. As it is
applied in the courts, among other places, it gives rise to observer-par-
ticipancy. Ask any American adolescent what we would look for to see
if a society is just and he or she will answer, sooner or later, with con-
ceptions drawn from the applications of the Bill of Rights. Judges, liti-
gants, reporters, and juries are responsible for what they often believe
themselves merely to be witnessing. Out of the chance collisions of in-
terests, billions of random acts of observer-participancy arise. Yet by
these acts the Constitution is changed just as surely as we are changed
by it.
The manners that occur in constitutional law must also occur and
have a meaning in everyday life. We must argue in everyday life. We
must arrive at decisions by way of arguments. It is the use of these
manners outside law-and of course this use is influenced by the re-
ports of legal decisions, opinions, and so forth-that makes their use
within constitutional law meaningful. "If there is a mystery to constitu-
tional law," T.R. Powell once wrote, "it is the mystery of the common-
place and the obvious, the mystery of the other mortal contrivances
that have to take some chances, that have to be worked by mortal
men."
316
I come now to the question with which I began. I have been en-
gaged in a study of the legitimacy of judicial review. I have, however,
gone about it in an odd way, beginning with the rejection of the usual
justifications for this review and taking up instead a consideration of
the kinds of argument that are customarily used in proving one justifi-
cation or the other. Now we have at last arrived at the question with
which we started. I hope this approach has not reminded you, as it has
sometimes reminded me, of Steinberg's first cartoon in The New
Yorker in 1941. 3' 7 In it a female art student defends to a stern instruc-
tor her reverse painting of a centaur-equine head, human hindquar-
ters-by saying: "But it is half man and half horse." '318 This upside-
316. Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, in ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 89 (R. McCloskey ed. 1957) (paraphrasing Holmes).
317. THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 25, 1941, at 15.
318. Id.
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down, topsy-turvy investigation was necessary if we were to avoid the
tacit assumption of a particular answer to the problem of judicial re-
view.
What then is the fundamental principle that legitimizes judicial
review? There is none. Indeed, it follows from what I have thus far
said that constitutional law needs no "foundation." Its legitimacy does
not derive from a set of axioms which, in conjunction with rules of
construction, will yield correct constitutional propositions. Indeed, I
would go further and say that the attempt to provide such a formula-
tion for constitutional law will likely lead to the superimposition of one
convention on the Constitution, because only within this do we achieve
the appearance of axiomatic derivation that the foundation-seeker is
looking for. We do not have a fundamental set of axioms that legiti-
mize judicial review. But we do have a Constitution, a participatory
Constitution, that accomplishes this legitimation.
The physicist John Wheeler has told us about a game of "20 ques-
tions":
You recall how it goes-one of the after-dinner party [is] sent out
of the living room, the others agreeing on a word, the one fated to
be questioner returning and starting his questions. "Is it a living
object?" "No." "Is it here on earth?" "Yes." So the questions
go from respondent around the room until at length the word
emerges: victory if in twenty tries or less; otherwise, defeat.
Then comes the moment when I am. . .sent from the room. [I
am] locked out unbelievably long. On finally being readmitted,
[I] find a smile on everyone's face, sign of a joke or a plot. [I]
innocently start [my] questions. At first the answers come quick-
ly. Then each question begins to take longer in the answering-
strange, when the answer itself is only a simple "yes" or "no." At
length, feeling hot on the trail, [I] ask, "Is the word 'cloud' ?"
"Yes," comes the reply, and everyone bursts out laughing. When
[I was] out of the room, they explain, they had agreed not to
agree in advance on any word at all. Each one around the circle
could respond "yes" or "no" as he pleased to whatever question
[I] put to him. But however one replied one had to have a word
in mind compatible with one's own reply-and with all the re-
plies that went before." 9
This story is an illuminating metaphor of the process of constitu-
tional decision. Note that if Wheeler had chosen to ask a different
question, he would have ended up with a different word. But, by the
same token, whatever power he had in bringing a particular word-
319. Lecture by Professor John Archibald Wheeler, University of Texas (Feb. 9, 1979) (copy
on file with the author).
773
Texas Law Review
"cloud"-into being was partial only. The very questions he chose
arose from and were limited by the answers given previously. In con-
stitutional law the choice of a particular function will determine the
sort of analysis that results in a particular case. On the other hand, the
choice of function is not determinative by itself, since the chance facts
of the case will make one convention rather than another appropriate
for each question in the case. Moreover, these facts are, in part, a result
of earlier constitutional decisions, and, in part, the result of the conven-
tions.
If law is predicting what a court will in fact do, then we have only
statistical predictions. This is not because judges and legislators are
corrupt or stupid, but because we cannot always say that one particular
convention or argument is correct in a particular case. We are put to
the choice as to what type of event it is, so that we may determine
which function to exercise. Only then can we determine the correct
argument. And so I think law is not just predicting what a court will
do, but why it will do it.
The finality of such decisions is commonly misunderstood. Our
view is distorted owing to the various crises that begin, develop, and
are resolved within the ongoing constitutional life. The constitutional
crisis, begun in the 1930s by the assault of Legal Realists on the Court,
and given political urgency by the frustration of the New Deal on con-
stitutional grounds, reached its climax in the case of Brown v. Board of
Education.320 The ratifying coda was sounded in the adoption of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.321 Not "guesses about the future," but the ordi-
nary functioning of a participatory Constitution brought this about.
It may be that Roe v. Wade has begun another such crisis.32 2 The
current calls for a constitutional convention attest to our bewilderment
at our problems and our deep faith in the constitutional instrument.
Such a convention would be unwise, but. it would scarcely be fatal nor
would it likely much change the Constitution. This is because the Con-
stitution is, in great measure, what we are, and a mere convocation is
unlikely to change us very much. We are, after all, in part what the
Constitution is and, as such, we resist stray appeals to change ourselves.
Our culture is made of many forms of life, of which the constitu-
tional-the ways of argument, of decision, of function-are but a few.
These, interworking, have assured constitutional decisionmaking a le-
gitimacy that could not be conferred.
320. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
321. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in scattered sections of 28, 42 U.S.C.).
322. See text accompanying notes 204-16 supra.
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Law reflects, and at the same time, determines the fate and worth
of our society. It has been our destiny to attempt what no society
before us has attempted, the making of justice through a constitution.
It is as we are. So it is not yet complete. I am prepared to believe it
holds within it fates as yet unfolded, toward which we are working.
Like the grub that builds its chamber for the winged thing it has never
seen but is to be,323 we labor within our forms of constitutional decision
to bring into being a just society. Our constitutional fate is determined
by the arguments by which the Constitution structures decision; yet we
determine their availability by our choice of constitutional functions.
The framers could do no more for us than bequeath us such decisions,
within such conventions. In our theories, therefore, are our fates.
323. The figure is from Holmes' speech at a dinner of the Harvard Law School Association of
New York on February 15, 1913, reprinted as LAW AND THE COURT, THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES
OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 168, 174 (M. Howe ed. 1962).
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